Corporate social responsibility and the cost of equity capital by Metz, Valentina
 
 
 
 
 
MAGISTERARBEIT 
Titel der Magisterarbeit 
„Corporate Social Responsibility and the Cost of Equity 
Capital: Do Capital Markets Reward CSR Performance 
of Firms?― 
Verfasserin 
Mag.a Valentina Metz 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Magistra der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
 (Mag. rer. soc. oec.) 
Wien, im September 2012  
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 066 914 
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Magisterstudium Internationale Betriebswirtschaft 
Betreuer: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Gyöngyi Lóranth 
 
 
 
II 
 
  
III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
―Economic analysis, by itself, cannot provide a torch that 
lights our way into the future, but economic vision could 
become the source of an awareness of ways by which a 
capitalist structure can broaden its motivations, increase 
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1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) of firms and  the concept of sustainable and 
responsible investment (SRI) have gained increased popularity over the last two 
decades. In the age of multimedia and communication, firms face higher costs of image 
losses. For example, the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico from 2010 showed that social 
and environmental catastrophes lead to bigger and longer lasting damages. 
Furthermore, institutional investors treat SRI as a part of its risk management and thus, 
SRI assets held by institutional investors in Europe1 doubled between 2007 and 2009. 
Interestingly, during the financial crisis of 2007, the reduction in assets under 
management (AuM) was lower for SRI than for traditional assets (Eurosif, 2010 and 
2008). By the end of 2009, total AuM in the Europe made up EUR 12.8 trillion and SRI 
AuM EUR 5 trillion. In the United States (U.S.), SRI AuM experienced a remarkably 
growth of 380 percent between 1995 and 2009 as well. While total AuM in the U.S. 
were USD 25.2 trillion, SRI AuM accounted for USD 3.07 trillion. As a consequence to 
the financial crisis in 2007, total AuM decreased between 2007 and 2009, but SRI AuM 
could register a positive growth rate (US SIF, 2010). 
Regarding financial reporting, the European Commission amended its 
Directive 78/660/EEC via Directive 2003/51/EC in June 2003 in order that companies 
―shall include both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key performance 
indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to 
environmental and employee matters‖ (Art. 46 (a) 1. (b)). While in 1992 no company 
reported on environmental, social or governmental (ESG) issues in the European 
Union (EU), in 2009 around 2,000 European firms released a sustainability report. 
Interestingly, there have been around three times more CSR reports published by firms 
from the EU than from North and Central America (Wensen et al., 2011).In certain EU 
member states, such as Denmark or Sweden, sustainability reporting is already 
mandatory. Sustainability reporting, in form of mandatory integrated reports is required 
in certain EU member states, exempli gratia in France (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). 
In Germany and Austria, a management report (―Lagebericht‖) needs to be enclosed to 
the annual report, including non-financial performance indicators about environmental 
and employee matters; a separate sustainability report is not required by law (see HGB 
§289 (3) and UGB §243 (5), respectively).Additionally, a corporate governance report 
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is required for stock listed companies in Germany and Austria (see AktG §161 and 
UGB §243b, respectively). 
As noted above, SRI became increasingly important in Europe. Within two years 
(between 2007 and 2009) SRI AuM grew by 87 percent and reached EUR 5 trillion at 
the end of 2009(Eurosif, 2010). In comparison, total AuM in the EU was EUR 12.755 
trillion in 2009 (EFAMA, 2012). Moreover, Europe2 holds a two third share of total SRI 
assets worldwide. Primary investors in SRI products were institutional investors, 
holding a market share of 92 percent of total European SRI market. In particular, public 
pension funds and reserve funds held nearly two thirds of all institutional investors’ SRI 
assets. The European average allocation of SRI assets was 53 percent bonds, 33 
percent equity and 14 percent other assets, including hedge funds, property, private 
equity, venture capital, monetary assets and commodities (Eurosif, 2010). 
In Germany, CSR and SRI evolved already in the 1970s with the first alternative bank 
―GLS Gemeinschaftsbank‖ founded in 1974. The official German Corporate 
Governance Code was published in February 2002 (Eurosif, 2003). While SRI AuM in 
Germany grew from EUR 5.3 billion in 2005 to EUR 12.9 billion in 2009, the share of 
SRI was about 0.8 percent of total AuM. Corresponding to EU average, institutional 
investors dominate the German SRI market. However, religious institutions and 
charities rather than pension funds account for the most important group of institutional 
investors for SRI products, while retail investors hold 45 percent of SRI market share. 
Furthermore, bonds comprise more than half of all German SRI assets (Eurosif, 2010). 
1.1 Objective 
The above presented figures demonstrate a growing supply and demand of SRI 
products. Hence, the question arises whether this growth has an effect on firms’ 
financing, particularly on their cost of equity capital. 
The objective of this thesis is a contribution to various empirical studies investigating a 
possible relationship between CSR performance and cost of equity capital. Two 
hypotheses will be tested – on whether CSR ratings affect cost of equity capital and 
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liquidity, respectively. The focus will be on German stock listed firms rated on their 
CSR performance by oekom research AG3. 
1.2 Structure 
This thesis will be structured as follows: After a brief introduction on the topic in chapter 
one, chapter two will provide a synopsis of a firm’s external financing options and cost 
of capital, followed by the problem of information asymmetries between management 
and investors. Furthermore, CSR will be defined including a discussion of a firm’s 
responsibility towards its shareholders and stakeholders; costs and benefits of CSR will 
be covered too. 
Chapter three will introduce an extensive list of related research regarding CSR 
performance and financial performance. In particular, empirical analyses examining a 
possible relationship between CSR ratings and cost of equity capital as well as equity 
beta will be presented. 
In chapter four, the two hypotheses tested will be presented. Chapter five will comprise 
the sample description as well as the applied empirical methods. In chapter six the 
results will be displayed and shortly explained. The thorough discussion of results will 
be in chapter seven, including a critical assessment of the empirical study itself. The 
thesis will be closed with some concluding remarks. 
Chapter eight will contain a complete list of references. The appendix will comprise 
used research material.  
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2 Theoretical Background 
In this chapter the theory behind corporate social responsibility (CSR) and external 
financing will be discussed. First, cost of capital and equity financing will be defined. 
Second, CSR will be introduced, followed by a presentation of various views on CSR 
regarding shareholders, society, costs and benefits. The chapter will conclude with a 
theoretical framework on how capital markets assess CSR performance and how this 
might be reflected in financial measures. 
2.1 External Financing 
This subchapter will introduce various ways of calculating cost of capital, including the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Ross (1976). Furthermore, different factors 
influencing equity beta will be presented and information asymmetry and agency costs 
will be discussed. 
2.1.1 Cost of Capital 
There are three different ways to finance a firm’s project: 1) bonds, 2) retained 
earnings, and 3) common stock(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). All have a cost of capital 
for the firm, id est expected rates of return on an investment for investors (Bodie et al., 
2007). 
There are various ways to calculate a firms cost of equity capital – either with the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), or with models based on analysts’ forecasts. The 
CAPM is a simplified model based on arbitrage theory and calculates cost of equity 
capital as the return of a riskless asset plus a risk premium (Ross, 1976). This model 
will be presented in detail in the next subchapter (see 2.1.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
and Cost of Equity Capital). Other models used to estimate the cost of equity capital, 
based on financial forecasts, have been published more recently. The following four 
models have been used in empirical studies for examining possible relationships 
between cost of equity capital and CSR performance (inter alia Chen et al., 2009; El 
Ghoul et al. 2011): 
 Model of Claus and Thomas (2001) 
This model calculates cost of equity capital derived from abnormal earnings 
computed with five years earnings forecasts and long-term growth rate in perpetuity. 
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 Model of Easton (2004) 
This model calculates cost of equity capital derived from abnormal earnings 
computed with one year dividend and two years earnings forecasts and abnormal 
earnings growth in perpetuity. 
 Model of Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) 
This model calculates cost of equity capital derived from share prices computed with 
three years forecasts of returns on equity and book values as well as subsequent 
linearly declining returns and constant dividend payouts in perpetuity. 
 Model of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
This model calculates cost of equity capital derived from two years earnings per 
share forecasts and forecasted perpetual growth. 
Other empirical studies (see chapter 3) in regard of the relationship between cost of 
equity capital and CSR performance used one or more of the above described models 
(Chava, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Gregory et al., 2011a; Richardson and Welker, 
2001). 
2.1.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model and Cost of Equity Capital 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a model to calculate the pricing of a risky 
asset, or rather on a firm-level the cost of equity capital. CAPM has been established 
by Ross (1976) and is based on the arbitrage theory. Under CAPM, the expected 
return for an asset equals the return of a riskless asset plus a risk premium for the risky 
asset. The risk premium is the expected excess return on the market multiplied by the 
beta coefficient on the market. This beta shows the correlation of an asset’s return with 
the market portfolio. In equilibrium, all independent risk has vanished; hence, in an 
arbitrage portfolio is no systematic risk, and the expected cost of capital equals the 
return of a riskless asset. However, CAPM also holds in all sorts of disequilibria (Ross, 
1976). 
Since only the beta coefficient is firm-specific in regard to CAPM, financial economists 
have conducted studies to find influencing factors with explanatory power of equity 
beta. Banz (1981) showed that firm size, measured as total market value of common 
stock, and equity returns were negatively correlated. More precisely, larger firms 
tended to have lower risk adjusted returns than small firms. This size effect was not 
linear, as the negative impact was strongest for small firms. Moreover, the effect was 
not stable over time with considerable differences of correlations in between tested 
periods. However, Banz reasoned the size effect could be the result of differences in 
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information availability which depend on firm size. Thus, investors would bear a higher 
estimation risk from small firms due to less information available. 
Furthermore, Fama and French (1993) developed a five-factor model based on capital 
asset pricing for inter alia estimating cost of capital. They identified five common risk 
factors in average stock returns. Those three from the stock market were size 
(measured as market capitalisation), book-to-market ratio and market beta. The results 
from Fama and French show that returns of small stocks were much more variable 
than those of big stocks. Moreover, the spread – predicted by the size-related risk 
factor – was large. Besides, the model suggests that firm size and book-to-market ratio 
override the influencing role of leverage as well as earnings-price ratio. 
In contrast, Bhandari (1988) found a significant positive relation between returns of 
common stocks and debt-to-equity ratio. He suggested that the level of leverage 
served as a proxy for the risk of common equity. Moreover, Bhandari argued that the 
premium which could be referred to debt-to-equity ratio was no ―risk premium‖ 
associated with equity beta. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that leverage was an influencing factor on cost of 
capital. On one hand, WACC increases with the level of leverage up to a certain extent. 
They argued that a modest amount of debt would not add much risk in a sound firm 
and hence, yields would not rise noticeably. On the other hand, cost of equity capital 
rises with the level of leverage. 
In regard to liquidity, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) have investigated a possible 
relation between stock returns and liquidity. They used bid-ask spreads to measure 
liquidity. Their results showed that average returns were significantly and positively 
related with spreads, id est more liquid stocks had lower returns. Moreover, they 
argued that there was a clientele effect, meaning that stocks with higher spreads 
tended to be held by long-term investors. Thus, stocks with lower levels of liquidity 
were less spread-sensitive. 
Investors are facing information risk when calculating expected returns and assessing 
a firm’s value. Hence, the following subsection will discuss information asymmetry and 
agency costs. 
2.1.3 Information Asymmetry 
In 1961, Stigler emphasised the importance of information in economic life and that 
―knowledge is power‖ (p. 213), but that current knowledge would become obsolete. 
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Hence, he argued that the only way to determine a price reflecting new conditions in 
the market was by search. The role of searching information was inter alia the 
identification of profitable investment opportunities. Despite uncertainty, Stigler (1961) 
argued that it was unprofitable to dispose all asymmetries due to costs of search for 
buyers and sellers. Moreover, the maintenance of correlation of successive prices was 
impossible due to search costs. Stigler finally concluded that ―reputation commands a 
price‖ (p. 224) as it cut down search. 
While symmetric information is uniformly distributed information, information 
asymmetry denotes unevenly distributed information among a firm’s management and 
its (potential) investors (Akerlof, 1970). Thus, asymmetric information creates 
uncertainty about the distinction between good and bad quality. This in turn gives rise 
to adverse selection and moral hazard, where sellers may provide misleading 
information and buyers demand a premium for bearing the risk of uncertainty (Akerlof, 
1970). 
In this regard, Myers and Majluf (1984) stated that when separating ownership from 
management, information asymmetries emerged naturally. Management just tends to 
know more about a firm’s value than its potential investors because it has inside 
information. This asymmetry goes beyond facts, as managers know what a firm can 
and cannot do because they have an insider view. Managers have organisational 
knowledge which is part of their human capital and transmitting their information to 
investors is costly. Even when there is no necessity to protect proprietary information, 
informing investors is costly in terms of both, time and money (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). 
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
There have been various studies conducted on the possible effects of CSR 
performance and firm valuation, particularly on profits (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 
2000; Gregory et al., 2011a; Cohen et al., 1997), stock market returns (e.g. Kempf and 
Osthoff, 2007; McGuire et al., 1988; Brammer et al., 2006), cost of equity capital (e.g. 
Richardson and Welker, 2001; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011) and risk 
profiles (e.g. Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Spicer, 1978; Gregory et al., 2011c). This 
subchapter defines CSR and presents different views on a firm’s responsibilities in 
regard to its shareholders and society. Furthermore, costs and benefits of CSR for 
firms are presented. 
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2.2.1 Definition of CSR 
There are various definitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR), whereas I deem 
the following three from the OECD, the World Bank, and the European Commission to 
be the currently most influencing ones: 
―Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is business's contribution to 
sustainable development.‖ (OECD, 2001) 
―The commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic 
development working with employees, their families, the local community, 
and society at large to improve their quality of life, in ways that are both 
good for business and good for development.‖ (World Bank Group, 2003) 
―A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis.‖ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001) 
The common tenor is that a firm makes contributions for a sustainable development. 
The European Commission limited its definition to only volunteer performance and 
explicitly integrated environmental concerns. Moreover, the Commission defined eight 
dimensions of CSR: 1) human resource management, 2) health and safety at work, 3) 
adaptation of change, 4) management of environmental impacts and natural resources, 
5) local communities, 6) business partners, suppliers and consumers, 7) human rights, 
and 8) global environmental concerns. 
Overall, CSR comprises social, environmental and corporate governance aspects with 
a long-term view, hence sustainability.  
2.2.2 Shareholder vs. Stakeholder 
After defining what CSR is, the question whether CSR falls under the actual scope of a 
firm arises. There exist both, opponents and proponents, who have arguments from 
economical and financial standpoints, without mentioning philosophical, ethical or 
purely social aspects. However, it depends on someone’s point of view which side to 
support. This topic is not a new one from the post-millennium era, but has rather been 
discussed since more than a century. 
Adam Smith (1776) did not deal with CSR itself, but society and individuals as a whole. 
He introduced the view that only self-interest can promote a society’s interest. 
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Therefore, meeting a firm’s self-interest will benefit society the most. Through prices, a 
society shows what it is willing to pay for specific goods and services. Production costs 
are the prices a society has to pay for their consumption. If society’s perceived value 
exceeds production costs, the society will make a gain and the firm a profit. Thus, the 
greater a society’s gain, the greater the firm’s profit (The Economist 2005). 
Already Levitt (1958) saw CSR as a danger to capitalism that could threaten a f irm’s 
motive for profit maximisation. Moreover, the CSR movement was, according to him, 
an attack against big corporations and the profit system. Levitt found CSR as an 
undermining of a firm’s survival for which a sustainable profit was important. 
Also Milton Friedman dealt with CSR in his book Capitalism and Freedom published  in 
1962. He advocated the perspective of a free society and capitalism stating that the 
only social responsibility of a firm is to increase its profits. Friedman (1970) saw the 
sole responsibility of a firm being towards its stakeholders – stockholders, customers 
and employees. Furthermore, according his point of view, managers and executives 
were not qualified for making decisions on how much and for what to spend money in 
regard to CSR. The only effect of CSR was an imposition of taxes and the decision on 
what to spend these. However, this would be the function of governments, not 
businesses. Sole exception were charity contributions, because these reduced tax 
payments and generated goodwill, hence were justifiable. Overall, Friedman (1970) 
saw CSR as a cost generator reducing a firm’s profits and stock price. 
While Levitt (1985) and Friedman (1970) recognised CSR as a threat to profit 
maximisation, Narver (1971) argued that a firm can only maximise its value through 
voluntary actions. More precisely, by incurring added costs in order to reduce its 
exposure to potential economic and legal risks – exempli gratia due to pollution – and 
communicating these actions to its markets, a firm will increase its revenues. 
Furthermore, a firm’s risks will be perceived lower and/or its expected earnings higher, 
what in turn increases a firm’s market value. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that subject matters about social responsibilities of 
business were seriously misleading. They stated that firms were no individuals but 
―legal fiction[s] which serve as a nexus of a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals‖ (p. 310). Moreover, firms would have no motivations or intentions like 
individuals, but rather market alike behaviour. 
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Reinhardt et al. (2008) discussed whether firms actually should voluntarily take CSR. 
They concluded that firms that incur costs for CSR activities may have to deal with 
shareholder litigation, takeovers, and even market exits in the long run. However, 
Reinhardt et al. (2008) argue that there was only little evidence that firms actually 
sacrificed profits for CSR and that firms rather performed CSR activities in a limited 
way so that it helped reaching their financial objectives. 
Another supporter of CSR has been Godfrey (2005). He suggested that philanthropic 
activities could generate moral capital among stakeholders and provide insurance-like 
protection for shareholders. Thus, corporate philanthropy could generate shareholder 
wealth. The level of optimal philanthropy for wealth creation however, varied between 
firms, increasing with a firm’s industry-specific and firm-specific risk profile. 
These theoretical views on whether a firm should or should not engage in voluntary 
CSR activities are very contrary and partly of philosophical economics. Moreover, their 
opinions of whether a company bears solely responsibilities towards its shareholders or 
also towards its other stakeholders are diverging. It seems that all parties support the 
view of shareholder wealth maximisation, but that those from the post-millennium era 
suggest that CSR, to at least a limited extent, can help to reach that. 
2.2.3 Costs and Benefits of CSR 
There are various benefits but also costs associated with CSR engagements. These 
will be described in detail below. 
Stakeholder commitment 
First of all, CSR performance can only be measured when it is disclosed. Voluntary 
disclosure can help a firm to create a competitive advantage (Greening and Turban, 
2000). Following stakeholder theory and agency theory, a relationship that is based on 
trust and cooperation between a firm and its stakeholders can reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour as well as contracting costs (Jones, 1995). However, only in 
developed countries and up to a certain extent a trusted cooperative relationship can 
lower these costs; if it is overused, it can trigger the contrary (Foo, 2007). Moreover, 
social identity theory states that a person’s self-image is influenced by the image and 
reputation of the employing firm; through disclosing CSR performance, a firm can 
attract and hire more high quality employees. Whereas signalling theory says that a 
firm’s image is shaped by the knowledge of the firm’s actions in respect to political and 
social issues as well as their stakeholders (Greening and Turban, 2000).Furthermore, 
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stakeholder-oriented firms tend to choose auditing firms for their assurance on 
sustainability reports to increase its credibility and reputation (Simnett et al., 2009). 
Hence, voluntary CSR disclosure can increase a firm’s stakeholder commitment to the 
firm, thus increase its competitive advantage through lower contracting costs and a 
higher qualified work force. 
Signalling effects 
Furthermore, voluntary disclosure implies signalling effects. Apart from a firm’s overall 
reputation, CSR disclosure can signal a management’s talents, id est a manager’s type 
of leadership. Voluntary disclosure is also used by managers to correct undervalued 
stock or justify poor earnings performance. Moreover, through voluntarily issuing 
further information beyond mandatory disclosure requirements, a firm can level out 
gaps as well as issue actual and non-financial information (Graham et al., 2004). Firms 
that have higher disclosure levels tend to perform well, are large or have only a weak 
correlation between annual stock returns and earnings. Good performance as an 
indicator for high disclosure levels can be explained by an adverse selection motive, 
since a firm’s performance has to exceed a certain threshold to cover disclosure costs. 
The weak above mentioned correlation might be explained by an information 
asymmetry motive, as with weak correlation, disclosed earnings do not reveal enough 
information to reduce the asymmetry between management and investors (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993). However, management tries to avoid too optimistic and too good 
disclosures, because these would be difficult to maintain over the long run (Graham et 
al., 2004). Nevertheless, disclosure tends to be one-sided as management considers 
the implied expected value of a risky prospect, and volunteers to issue the upside 
potential rather than the downside risk (Hobson and Kachelmeier, 2005). In addition, 
volunteer disclosure of ―bad news‖ is also used for signalling credibility. On one hand, it 
reduces information risk and can be presented in the best possible way; and on the 
other hand, it can improve a firm’s reputation as one that shares information timely and 
accurately (Graham et al., 2004).Stigler (1986) already noted that a firm’s reputation 
ruled its price because it cuts down costs of information search (see 2.1.3 Information 
Asymmetry). Hence, voluntary CSR disclosure could serve as a signal for improving a 
firm’s and a manager’s reputation, correct undervalued stock, as well as reduce 
information asymmetry and information risk. 
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Cost avoiding motives 
Apart from image concerns, firms volunteer in communicating bad news to avoid 
possible lawsuits (Graham et al., 2004). However, possible litigation costs can also 
reduce the level of voluntary disclosure, particularly for prospective information. 
Competition also has a restraining effect on the level of voluntary disclosure. By 
revealing sensitive information to competitors through additional unsolicitous disclosure 
(about projects to be realised in the future),a firm would face proprietary costs. 
Moreover, issuing further information could bear political costs too. Thus, managers 
want to avoid undesirable attention from regulators. Moreover, there is empirical 
evidence that firms are willing to forgo economic value for meeting short run earning 
targets(Graham et al., 2004). Hence, CSR disclosure can induce costs too, particularly 
in regard to litigation, competition and politics. These potential cost prospects can limit 
the level of disclosure.  
Capital market motives 
Along with the above described motives and effects, there are incentives from capital 
markets to increase voluntary disclosure too. First, the more information is available 
about a firm, the more it attracts analysts. Analyst coverage in turn has an important 
influence on stock prices (Graham et al., 2004). Second, reduced information 
asymmetries increase market liquidity which attracts institutional investors. These 
institutional investors provide trading activity and hold large positions (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991).Third, additional information lowers information risk which helps to 
build and nurture relationships with institutional investors (Graham et al., 2004). Fourth, 
not only voluntary disclosure but also CSR performance itself attract institutional 
investors, because they face utmost pressure to take sustainable and responsible 
investment (SRI) decisions (Cox et al., 2004).  Fifth, voluntary CSR disclosure can 
have a negative effect on a firm’s cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
investors tend to be most interested in so called ESG (environmental, social and 
governance)  disclosure scores – a score that measures the degree of transparency, 
provided inter alia by Bloomberg L.P4. After ESG disclosure scores, investors are most 
interested in governance, environment and social disclosure, respectively (Eccles et 
al., 2011). Hence, voluntary CSR disclosure can attract more analysts and institutional 
investors, as well as increase liquidity and reduce its cost of capital. 
                                               
4
Bloomberg L.P. is a network of business and financial information (see www.bloomberg.com). 
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Despite these primarily theoretical approaches of potential costs and benefits in 
respect to CSR performance, it is the reactions of capital markets that interests 
management the most when deciding over the level of CSR performance. Thus, the 
following subchapter will present primarily theoretical frameworks on how the capital 
market might value CSR performance and its disclosure. 
2.3 CSR and Capital Markets 
An investment concept named ―sustainable and responsible investment‖ (SRI) gained 
popularity in the post-millennium era. In Europe5total SRI assets under management 
grew from less than EUR 3 trillion  in the year 2007to EUR 5 trillion in 2009. SRI stands 
for the ―valuation and incorporation of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
issues into fund management‖ (Eurosif, 2010). Thus, this subchapter will discuss 
investor’s preferences and market valuation regarding CSR. 
2.3.1 Investor’s Preferences 
Albeit the impressive growth of SRI assets, total core SRI assets only represent ten 
percent of total assets under management in Europe (Eurosif, 2010). Hence, knowing 
the supply of stock from CSR active firms, its demand by investors will be considered 
more closely as follows: 
Mackey et al. (2007) suggest in their theory that there are investors that base their 
decision on other criteria than just wealth maximisation. More precisely, some investors 
derive benefit, apart from earnings benefit, from CSR activities of the invested firm. 
Additionally, Mackey et al. (2007) theorise that if demand of stocks with high CSR 
performance exceeds its supply, CSR based investments will create economic value 
for those firms. If supply exceeds demand, CSR activities can destroy market values of 
these firms. 
Another theory about ―green investors‖ has been developed by Heinkel et al. (2001). In 
particular the authors assume that green investors who have no tolerance of 
environmental damage, exclude polluting firms from their portfolios. This exclusion 
creates a lack of risk-sharing amongst green-neutral investors which in turn reduces 
stock prices of polluting firms and thereby increases their cost of capital. If the increase 
in cost of capital exceeds the costs for reforming, polluting firms will take CSR actions. 
Thus, green investors can change corporate behaviour. 
                                               
5
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway.  
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Besides theoretical approaches of investors’ preferences, Eccles et al.(2011) examined 
the interests of investors regarding a firm’s degree of transparency. They found that 
interests of equity investors differ from debt investors. Equity investors were most 
interested in overall ESG disclosure scores, as they serve as an indicator for 
management quality. Environmental disclosure scores ranked second, which shows 
that equity investors were concerned about possible economic, legislative and 
regulatory effects on equity prices. While investors were also interested in 
governmental disclosure scores, social disclosure was not included in their top 20 
preferences list. Eccles et al. (2010) also found differences between types of investors. 
Overall, insurance companies were most interested in disclosure scores, followed by 
pension funds and hedge funds showed the least interest. The first two are investing 
more in assets with a long-term perspective where low degrees of transparency would 
bear a high risk level of uncertainties. Hedge funds, on the other hand, can interpret 
lack of transparency as potential hedge opportunities since those firms might be 
undervalued due to high uncertainty levels. 
When asking investors in surveys about CSR, most of them reported to believe that 
corporate governance can affect a firm’s actions and its value (Starks, 2009). 
Particularly institutional investors shared this opinion. Nevertheless, empirical evidence 
on the effect corporate governance on firm value was mixed. Moreover, only a minority 
of investors, mostly specialised institutional investors, thought that social responsibility 
matters could affect a firm’s actions and its value (Starks, 2009). 
In addition, Cox et al. (2004) examined institutional investors’ preferences. They found 
that long term investment positions of institutional investors were positively correlated 
with CSR performance. Furthermore, these investors’ selection process was 
characterised by the rejection of firms with the worst CSR performance. Institutional 
investors seemed not to prefer companies with charitable contributions. 
Analyst recommendations have an impact on investor’s decision as well. The empirical 
evidence by Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) showed that analysts changed their 
perception of CSR performance over time. While in earlier periods (before 1997) CSR 
strategies were treated as value destructive and negatively affected recommendations, 
in later periods analysts graded CSR strengths as value enhancements. Thus, later 
analysts were more likely to recommend a firm with high levels of CSR performance. 
Moreover, firms with higher transparency in regard to CSR activities tended to get more 
favourable recommendations. Analysts’ ability was found to be correlated with higher 
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valuation of CSR performance; meaning that analysts with more experience, greater 
availability of resources as well as broader awareness of CSR tended to treat CSR 
strengths as creating firm value. 
Hence, investors can change the demand-supply ratio of CSR active firms and thereby 
influence the effect on valuation of CSR performance, id est market value as well as 
cost of capital. Investors, particularly institutional investors, are interested in ESG and 
individual disclosure scores and their decisions seem to be influenced by them. 
Moreover, analysts became perceiving CSR activities as value creating and their 
recommendations influence investors’ investment decisions as well. 
2.3.2 CSR and Market Valuation 
Besides investor’s interests and opinions, financial performance and capital market 
indicators, such as liquidity or cost of capital, can reflect possible CSR effects too. Heal 
(2005) argues that CSR can reduce costs of conflicts since CSR plays an important 
resource allocation role in the cases of market failures and strong distributional 
disagreements. Hence, Heal (2005) sees CSR as a profitable component of corporate 
strategy and as a contribution to risk management, which can reduce costs and in turn 
increase profits. Moreover, he reasons that CSR helps maintaining relationships for 
ensuring long term profitability. 
A hypothesis regarding outperformance by Renneboog et al. (2008) states that CSR 
signals good management quality which favours financial performance by decreasing 
the likelihood of incurring high costs. Thus, firms with high level of CSR performance 
can – but not necessarily do– outperform benchmarks. The key assumption underlying 
this hypothesis is that stock markets do not price CSR activities correctly in the short 
run. Moreover, Renneboog et al. (2008) concluded that there was no clear evidence 
that SRI investors trade optimal financial performance for pursuing social and ethical 
objectives. 
Furthermore, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggestedthat increased disclosure levels 
lower bid-ask spreads of stocks. Bid-ask spreads measure the level of information 
asymmetry between management and investors and are related to costs of capital. In 
addition, they find that an improved disclosure level can raise trading volumes of the 
firm’s shares outstanding. Trading volumes measure the level of liquidity of a firm’s 
stock, id est the willingness of investors to buy and sell shares of that firm. Thus, Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000) conclude that voluntarily committing to increased disclosure 
levels can yield financial benefits in regard to cost of capital. 
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Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) argued that cost of equity capital and the commitment 
to CSR disclosure were more strongly related compared to the association of cost of 
equity capital with the level of CSR disclosure; this might be due to the commitment to 
disclosure which solely claims information disclosure irrespective of its content. 
Furthermore, the authors reasoned that voluntary disclosure improved a firm’s liquidity 
of stock through reducing the information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors. This in turn lowered a firm’s cost of capital. Besides, if prior 
asymmetry of information was large, the subsequent stock price would rise too. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) conclude that a maximum stock price can be only 
achieved with some information asymmetry, and large firms financially benefit most 
from voluntary disclosure. 
Regarding levels of disclosure, Hail and Leuz (2006) found that in countries with tight 
securities regulations – such as comprehensive disclosure rules and effective law 
enforcement – firms’ costs of capital, measured as the implied cost of capital, were 
systematically lower. Particularly in countries with mandatory issuance to investors, the 
cost of capital effect strongest was. In countries with the least integrated markets the 
disclosure level affected cost of capital the most. However, the discovered relationship 
between disclosure levels and cost of capital was insignificant in countries with 
integrated capital markets. 
In case arbitrage pricing theory holds, Hughes et al. (2007)argued that information 
about systematic factors, id est information from the market, would affect cost of capital 
through factor risk premiums. Such systematic factor information would not influence 
factor loadings (beta). However, they reasoned that information about idiosyncratic 
risks(firm specific)would not have an effect on a firm’s cost of capital. Thus, CSR 
performance reducing firm specific risks should have no effect on cost of equity capital. 
Nevertheless, a lower ratio of informed over uninformed investors about a firm would 
reduce uncertainties of this firm and, thus lower its cost of capital. As a consequence, a 
higher level of CSR disclosure can reduce a firm’s cost of capital due more informed 
investors. 
Feldman et al. (1997) investigated annual reports in regard to environmental 
information disclosure. They found that increased environmental disclosure 
substantially lowers risk perception of that firm. Thus, the stock price increases by 
about five percent. Feldman et al. (1997) argued that disclosure above mandatory 
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enhanced shareholder value. Furthermore, they reasoned that environmental 
investments could give rise to considerably positive returns as well as lasting value. 
Hence, CSR activities and disclosure can reduce costs of conflicts and the likelihood of 
incurring further costs, thus improving financial performance. Increased disclosure can 
lower bid-ask spreads and elevate share turnover of a firm’s stock (liquidity). Higher 
levels of CSR disclosure can reduce a firm’s cost of capital, though such negative 
effect on cost of capital is more significant in countries with least integrated markets. 
Moreover, increased environmental performance and its disclosure can enhance a 
firm’s stock price as well as its shareholder value. 
While this chapter has focused on the theoretical grounds of CSR and cost of capital, 
the next chapter will present an extensive list of prior studies related to CSR disclosure 
and its impacts on profitability, accounting figures, stock market returns, cost of equity 
capital as well as risk premiums. 
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3 Related Research 
Besides various theoretical approaches regarding cost of capital and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), many empirical research studies have been conducted. All 
studies presented below analysed a possible relationship between CSR and financial 
performance, though from different perspectives. While some analyses have focused 
on CSR and voluntary disclosure of information, others aimed to investigate the link 
between CSR and profits as well as other accounting figures. Other studies used stock 
market measures, such as returns, cost of equity capital and beta, to find a link 
between financial and CSR performance. Hence, this chapter on related research is 
divided into six subchapters covering the above five research areas as well as two 
meta-analyses. 
3.1 Disclosure and Assurance 
As discussed in chapter 2 (see 2.1.3 Information Asymmetry and 2.2.3 Costs and 
Benefits of CSR), firms additionally communicate information beyond what they are 
legally required to do in order to reduce asymmetric information. Although CSR 
disclosure is mandatory in certain countries in the form of an integrated report 
(see 1 Introduction), the quality and depth of sustainability or environmental reports 
vary between firms across industries and countries (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). 
In respect to disclosure level and cost of equity capital, Botosan (1997) found a 
negative relationship between voluntary disclosure in annual reports and cost of equity 
capital only in firms with low analyst following. Greater level of disclosure seemed to 
have no effect on firms with high analyst following. However, the sample of included 
firms was rather small and limited(122 U.S. manufacturing companies from 1990). 
Moreover, the analysed annual reports were from the year 1990 and within the last 22 
years, legal requirements and corporate disclosure common practice has faced a lot of 
change.  
Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) analysed the content of 198 U.S. companies’ information which 
had been reported in SEC Forms 10-K regarding recycled toxic waste in 1994. Their 
main finding was a positive and significant relationship between environmental and 
economic performance. Furthermore, their results showed a significant association of 
high environmental performance level with more extensive and quantifiable disclosure 
of this performance. 
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Although one could think that discretionary disclosure would attract opportunistic 
behaviour and that companies would tend to publish more than optimistic forecasts in 
order to reduce financial constraints or improve short-term financial statistics, a study 
by Frankel et al. (1995), with a sample of 1,880 U.S. firms (1980-1983), showed the 
contrary. Despite Frankel et al. (1995) found a positive relationship between firms with 
external financing and issuing earnings forecasts, their empirical evidence showed that 
forecasts by management did not tend to be systematically higher – neither in 
comparison to analysts’ expectations nor to subsequently realised earnings. Moreover, 
the results showed that firms were not more likely to disclose more forecasts just 
before issuing more capital. Thus, Frankel et al. (1995) concluded that forces like 
potential legal liability as well as reputation costs motivated management to disclose 
unfavourable information too. 
In some countries the issuance of a sustainability report is already governed by 
regulations (see 1 Introduction). Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) investigated the effect of 
prescribing the issuance of sustainability reports by law on management practices in 58 
countries. Their sample covered more than 3,000 unique firms and the years 1995 until 
2008. Their empirical study shows that mandatory sustainability reporting increases 
CSR of business leaders, id est improves ethical and social behaviour as well as 
promotes prioritising sustainable development. The results suggest that non-disclosure 
of bad performance or loss of credibility through failure to meet previously published 
false expectations can effectively force management to change its corporate behaviour 
in the long-run. These effects were found to be even stronger in countries with greater 
enforcement mechanisms and more frequent assurance of information about 
sustainability. 
Hence, the above described empirical studies provide evidence that firms which are 
more active in regard to environmental protection disclose more information voluntarily. 
Furthermore, only firms with low analyst following benefit from a reducing effect of cost 
of equity capital from voluntary disclosure. Market forces generally deters management 
from disclosing over-optimistic forecasts and only favourable information. In addition, 
mandatory disclosure of sustainability reports effectively improves a firm’s ethical, 
environmental and social performance. 
3.2 Profits and Other Accounting Figures 
Beyond the effect of disclosing non-financial information, the effect of social and 
environmental performance on a firm’s profitability, based on accounting figures, has 
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been analysed. Regarding profits, no direct significant association has been found (see 
studies as follows). 
Only Bnouni (2011) found a positive marginal relationship between the level of CSR 
and financial performance, measured as the ratio of profit over turnover, for 80 French 
small and medium enterprises in the year 2006. Her results provide evidence in favour 
of the slack resources theory for which a certain level of profitability is necessary for a 
firm to sustain a social responsible strategy. 
However, McWilliams and Siegel (2000) conducted an empirical study of 524 U.S. 
firms (1991-1996) and their results showed only a ―neutral impact‖ of CSR on 
accounting profits. Furthermore, they argued that former studies investigating this 
relation were inconclusive and mostly upwardly biased because research and 
development (R&D) expenditures – the important driver of profits – had been ignored. 
In comparison, Gregory et al. (2011a) found a positive and significant relationship 
between CSR and net income per share, book value per share as well as R&D 
expenditures for their sample of U.S. firms (19,050 firm-year observations). Their 
results suggest that principally the negative valuation of CSR drives the effect of the 
investigated valuation measures. Gregory et al. (2011c) provided empirical evidence 
that a high CSR rating had a positive impact on net income and net book value with a 
portfolio returns test of U.S. firms (23,856 firm-year observations) between the years 
1991 and 2008. They argued that if there was a virtuous circle between CSR and 
financial performance, R&D expenditures and CSR indicators both would positively 
affect a firm’s market value. 
Moreover, Hassel et al. (2005) showed in their study of 71 Swedish stock listed 
companies (1998-2000) that both, net income and equity book value, had an 
explanatory power regarding environmental performance. However, according to their 
empirical results, good environmental ratings had a negative influence on the analysed 
market values. Hassel et al. (2005) explained the negative relationship by means of the 
―cost-concerned school‖ (p. 56) which takes the view that great environmental 
performance negatively affected market values and expected earnings through higher 
costs incurred. 
Covering the years 1977 until 1985 with a sample of 131 U.S. firms, McGuire et 
al. (1988) found a negative relationship between CSR and operating income growth, 
which was even stronger for growth prior to the rating than for subsequent income 
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growth. They suggested that financial performance associated with CSR ratings might 
be partially artefacts of prior high financial performance. Moreover, McGuire et 
al. (1988)argued that for firms with high financial performance higher levels of CSR 
performance were easier affordable. 
The relationship between CSR and profitability, measured by the return on assets 
(ROA), has been investigated as well. Aupperle et al. (1985) conducted an empirical 
study of 241 U.S. companies for the year 1982.The results suggested no relationship 
between ROA and CSR. 
Cohen et al. (1997) investigated two pollution portfolios of 375 U.S. companies 
between 1987 and 1991, with low and high levels, respectively. They found no 
statistically significant relation between environmental performance and ROA and 
return on equity (ROE), respectively. Cohen et al. (1997) explained the result in a way 
that firms in the high pollution portfolio might have found ways to increase their 
environmental performance cost-efficiently over time. 
Choi et al. (2010) analysed the relationship between ROA, ROE as well as Tobin’s Q 
(total market value over total asset value) and CSR of 187 Korean firms for a period of 
seven years (2002-2008). The authors found that ROA was positively correlated with 
CSR, and when using a stakeholder-weighted index, they even found positive 
correlations between all three performance measures and CSR. Moreover, their 
analysis revealed a positive and significant relationship between CSR and ROA, ROE 
as well as Tobin’s Q. 
In addition, McGuire et al. (1988) found positive relations between CSR and ROA as 
well as total assets. Besides, they found that prior rather than subsequent accounting 
performance was more closely related to CSR. Their study provided evidence that 
particularly ROA was a better CSR predictor than market measures. McGuire et 
al. (1988) argued that accounting measures were more sensitive to unsystematic 
factors than market measures. Hence, if the perception of CSR was unsystematic, 
ROA will better reflect a firms CSR level than any other market measure. 
Waddock and Graves (1997) showed with their empirical research that good financial 
performance – measured as ROA, ROE and return on sales– leaded to higher 
corporate social performance and vice versa. The authors also suggested a possible 
virtuous circle between financial and corporate social performance, simultaneously and 
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interactively impacting each other. Their sample covered 469 U.S. firms and a time 
period of three years (1989-1991). 
Eccles et al. (2012) used ASSET4 ratings from Thomson Reuters of 180 U.S. firms. 
They examined the association of voluntary CSR performance with a firm’s stock 
market return, measured with ROA, ROE and market-to-book value, and leverage over 
a time horizon of 18 years (1993-2005). Their results provided evidence that in the 
long-run, high CSR rated firms significantly outperformed low CSR rated firms in terms 
of accounting performance. Particularly in industries, where competition for brands and 
reputation was very strong or products depended heavily on natural resources, 
outperformance was even greater. 
Apart from profit and profitability, there are more accounting figures which have been 
analysed in terms of a possible association with CSR. Cochran and Wood (1984) used 
for their empirical study the following five measures: operating earnings over sales, 
operating earnings over assets, excess value, asset age and asset turnover. They 
analysed U.S. firms between 1970 and 1979 (366 firm-year observations). The authors’ 
main finding was a strong and significant correlation between CSR and asset age 
within industry groups, while operating earnings over sales and excess value of minor 
significance for CSR. Thus, firms with younger assets proved to have better CSR 
ratings. Cochran and Wood (1984) concluded that there was only weak support for a 
relationship between financial performance and CSR. 
Furthermore, Lev et al. (2010) investigated the relationship between sales growth and 
charitable contributions of 251 U.S firms (1989-2000). Particularly for companies in 
highly sensitive consumer goods sectors they found a positive and significant 
correlation between sales growth and charitable contributions. Only a marginally 
significant relation between revenues and future contributions was revealed, but a 
positive significant association between contributions and future revenues. Lev et al. 
(2010) conclude that charitable giving could improve future sales and revenues as well 
as further a firm’s economic objectives. 
McGuire et al. (1988) analysed 131 U.S. companies in respect to CSR and various 
financial and accounting performance measures as well. However, they found no 
statistical significance between sales growth and CSR. 
Based on accounting figures, Cheng et al. (2012) examined the relationship between 
CSR ratings and financial constraints of firms from 49 different countries (2002-2009). 
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They constructed a KZ index developed from and named by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), consisting of five accounting ratios: cash flow to total capital, market to 
book ratio, debt to total capital, dividends to total capital, and cash holdings to capital. 
Their empirical results of 10,078 firm-year observations showed that firms with higher 
CSR ratings faced lower capital constraints. Cheng et al. (2012) explained the better 
access to finance through less opportunistic behaviour by superior stakeholder 
engagement, and reduced information asymmetries by greater disclosure. 
Hence, there is no empirical proof for a relationship between a firm’s profit and CSR, 
but for CSR and net income as well as R&D expenditures. There are only inconclusive 
results regarding the relationship between CSR and ROA or ROE, respectively. 
Moreover, there is a positive association between CSR and Tobin’s Q; however, these 
results are from the same study that has found a positive correlation for ROA, ROE and 
CSR. Besides, asset age and CSR are negatively but significantly correlated within 
industry groups. Although charitable contributions can improve future sales and 
revenues, there was no statistically significant relationship between sales growth and 
CSR. One positive effect of better CSR ratings are reduced financial constraints due to 
superior stakeholder engagement and greater disclosure of information. 
3.3 Stock Market Returns 
Apart from accounting figures, measures from financial markets have been used to 
analyse a possible impact of CSR on a firm’s performance. One of the most prominent 
financial performance measures are monthly stock returns. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) 
formed two portfolios based on CSR performance of U.S. stock listed firms covering 
the S&P500 between 1991 and 2004. The high CSR performance portfolio never had a 
considerable negative performance or performed any loss. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) 
concluded that trading strategies based on CSR screens could yield abnormal 
performance compared to the average market. 
Ziegler et al. (2002) investigated the relationship between monthly stock returns and 
environmental and social sustainability of 214 European stock-listed firms (1996-2001). 
They found that a high level of both, environmental and social performance, had a 
significant positive and negative effect on a firm’s valuation, respectively. However, 
these findings only hold true when comparing industries, but not companies; Ziegler et 
al. (2002) found no significant effect on stock returns on a company level. 
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Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) used SIC codes for identifying firms in so called ―sin 
industries‖, namely alcohol, tobacco and gaming. Their sample comprised 193 U.S. 
firms and 42 years (1962-2003). The results provided evidence that firms in sin 
industries had higher expected returns than comparable firms in other industries. Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2009) argued that investors were willing to pay a (financial) price for 
not holding stock of sin industries. 
McGuire et al. (1988) analysed the relationship between risk-adjusted returns and 
CSR, but no statistically significant result was revealed. However, Cohen et al. (1997) 
empirically proved that total risk-adjusted returns to shareholders were significantly 
related to the environmental performance of a firm. They used a sample of 375 U.S. 
firms included in the S&P 500 index and formed one low and one high pollution 
portfolio. Cohen et al. concluded that the low pollution portfolio met or even 
outperformed the S&P 500 market. 
Financial performance, measured as return on stock, was also the main variable 
Brammer et al. (2006) used for investigating a possible relationship between corporate 
social and financial performance of 451 UK firms listed at the Financial Times Stock 
Exchange per July 2002. Their results showed a significant negative relation between 
the two performance measures; only firms with low CSR ratings yielded abnormal 
returns. Brammer et al. (2006) concluded that certain investors had to be willing to 
forgo returns in order to be morally on the safe side. However, their results suggested 
that firms were punished by a negative impact on the bottom line, which shareholders 
seemed to realise only slowly. 
In respect to timing, Brammer and Millington (2008) analysed the correlation between 
corporate charitable giving and a firm’s market performance, measured as change in 
stock price plus current dividends over prior period’s stock price, in the UK. Their 
research sample comprised 537 firms and ten years (1990-1999). The results showed 
that firms with unusually high and low charitable ratings had the higher financial 
performances. More precisely, firms with unusually low social performance financially 
performed best in the short run, while firms with unusually high social performance 
financially performed best in the long run. 
Rao (1996) analysed 14 U.S. companies between 1989 and 1993. Not surprising is his 
finding that when unethical behaviour, particularly regarding pollution, had been 
discovered and published, the stock value in terms of cumulated average abnormal 
returns had fallen. 
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The effect of the inclusion of a firm in a sustainability index was investigated as well. 
Robinson et al. (2008) analysed the relationship between the inclusion of 186 North 
American firms in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index(DJSI) and their possible 
cumulative abnormal returns between 2002 and 2007. The authors’ main finding was 
that an inclusion in the DJSI permanently increased a firm’s share price. 
Goss (2007) examined a possible link between CSR ratings and financial distress in 
the U.S. (1,295 firm-year observations, 1991-2003). He found a significant negative 
relationship between a firm’s rating and its distance to default. Accordingly, his results 
showed that firms with high CSR ratings were less likely to exit the market than to be 
taken over; whereas low rated firms faced the same likelihood of a default and a 
takeover. Therefore, Goss (2007) argued that CSR levels did not only have an impact 
on returns, but also on a firm’s risk profile. 
Hence, there is inconclusive empirical evidence on the relationship between CSR and 
stock returns. On one hand, portfolios consisting of firms with only good CSR 
performance yield abnormal performance in the U.S. On the other hand, empirical 
results of UK firms suggest a negative relationship between CSR performance and 
stock returns. Moreover, firms in sin industries tend to have higher expected returns 
than other comparable firms. Another study of U.S. companies (McGuire et al., 1988) 
has not found any impact of CSR ratings on risk-adjusted returns. At an industry level, 
high ratings for environmental sustainability seem to have a positive effect on stock 
returns, but high ratings for social sustainability a negative effect; the latter seems to 
not holding true at a company level. Although unusually low corporate charitable giving 
can positively impact the stock performance in the short run, the opposite might apply 
over a long time horizon. Furthermore, the discovery and publication of polluting 
activities of a firm might have a negative impact on its abnormal returns while the 
inclusion in a sustainability index permanently increases a firms share price. In 
addition, CSR levels seem to be an important determinant of financial distress, showing 
a negative relationship between CSR ratings and distance to default. 
3.4 Cost of Equity Capital 
One specific performance measure of capital markets is a firm’s cost of capital, and in 
particular its cost of equity capital (see 2.1.1 Cost of Capital). Various studies have 
been conducted to examine a possible relationship between a firm’s CSR ratings and 
cost of equity capital in order to see whether capital markets punish or reward great 
CSR performance; these will be described more closely in this subsection. 
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In regard to disclosing CSR performance in a firm’s annual report, 
Richardson and Welker (2001) examined 124 Canadian firms’ cost of equity capital and 
their level of social disclosure (1990-1992). They found that CSR disclosure ratings and 
cost of equity capital were significantly positively related, but less pronounced in firms 
with good financial performance. The disclosure ratings were exclusively rating the 
completeness and informativeness of disclosure, but not the content itself. Richardson 
and Welker (2001) argued that this positive relation might have aroused from self-
promoting grounds with a severe upward bias, disclosing more information about a 
firm’s social investments, and costs incurred that the market might penalise through 
higher costs of equity capital. 
Compared to Richardson and Welker (2001), Dhaliwal et al. (2011) provided empirical 
evidence from 213 U.S. firms (1993-2007) that voluntary CSR disclosure is associated 
with a decrease in a firm’s cost of equity capital. Furthermore, high cost of capital firms 
were more likely to initiate CSR disclosure in the subsequent year than firms with lower 
cost of capital. Those initiating firms with high CSR performance then had reduced 
costs of equity capital, attracted more institutional investors and analysts that also 
tended to reach smaller forecast errors. More importantly, firms initiating CSR 
disclosure were more likely than others to issue new equity capital in the subsequent 
two years and to a significantly greater amount. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) suggested that 
managers initiated CSR disclosure in order to raise cheaper external capital. 
The majority of studies assessing a possible link between CSR ratings and cost of 
equity capital used a sample of U.S. companies and CSR ratings by KLD Research & 
Analytics Inc. (now MSCI Inc.) covering all or a part from a time horizon between the 
years 1990 and 2008.One of these studies conducted by El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
examined a possible CSR effect on a firm’s equity financing of 2,809 U.S. firms (1992-
2007). Their results provided evidence that better rated firms had lower cost of equity 
capital. Particularly improvements in the areas of employees, environment and product 
strategies substantially reduced a firm’s cost of equity capital, whereas the areas 
community, diversity and human rights had no impact. Moreover, El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
showed that operating in ―sin industries‖ – tobacco and nuclear power – led to an 
increase of capital costs. The authors argued that CSR performance had explanatory 
power regarding a firm’s cost of equity capital ―beyond corporate governance and other 
risk factors‖ (p. 2401). 
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Markets not always rewarded firms for high CSR performance to the same extent. 
According to the empirical results from Gregory et al. (2011b) of U.S. firms (23,078 
firm-year observations, 1990-2008), markets appeared to higher value better CSR 
ratings in the post-millennium period. The valuation effect was on one hand caused by 
a cost of capital effect rewarding firms for a high level of CSR performance. On the 
other hand, a cash flow effect made higher rated firms more persistent against 
abnormal earnings shocks. The authors noted that portfolios which were based on 
CSR ratings did not implicitly outperform the market. 
In contrast to Gregory et al. (2011b) who used realised returns as the measurement of 
the cost of equity capital, Chava (2010) used implied costs of capital (ICC) derived from 
earnings estimates made by analysts. The sample covered between 500 and 2,000 
U.S. firms for each of the investigated 18 years (1991-2008). Nevertheless, his results 
provided evidence that firms with environmental concerns faced significantly higher 
costs of capital. Firms with environmental strengths though showed no significant 
association with expected stock returns. Chava (2010) argued that this cost effect 
might emerge from socially responsible investors not investing in firms with 
environmental concerns. This argument was supported by his results showing that 
both, firms with environmental concerns but also with environmental strengths, tended 
to have lower institutional ownership and fewer institutional investors than neutral firms. 
The results support the above presented findings of El Ghoul et al. (2011) regarding sin 
industries. 
Furthermore, Gregory et al. (2011a)examined the relationship between ICC and CSR 
ratings. Their study provided evidence that firms with high CSR ratings had significantly 
lower ICC and higher expected growth rates in abnormal earnings than low rated firms. 
Gregory et al. (2011a) suggested that the valuation effect, or the positive impact on 
stocks of high CSR rated firms, was driven by an interaction of both, long-term ICC and 
implied growth of abnormal earnings. They argued that firms with high CSR ratings 
faced significantly lower levels of market risk exposure which explains the positive 
impact of CSR ratings on expected stock performance. 
In contrast to the above described studies, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) used the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to calculate a firm’s weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC), including cost of equity capital, cost of debt capital and equity beta. 
Their sample comprised 267 U.S. firms for the year 2002.The empirical results showed 
that superior environmental performance reduced a firm’s WACC. Sharfman and 
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Fernando (2008) argued that improvements in environmental performance improved a 
firm’s environmental and subsequently overall risk management. Moreover, the authors 
found that although firms with increased environmental performance tended to be 
higher leveraged; these firms still faced both, lower cost of equity capital and WACC. 
Like Chava (2010), Sharfman and Fernando (2008) also showed that improvements in 
environmental risk management reduced the level of institutional holders of a firm. 
Their results did not validate a relationship between cost of equity capital and the level 
of institutional holdings. Furthermore, environmental risk management performance 
was positively related to share ownership concentration, and ownership dispersion was 
negatively associated with cost of equity capital. 
Most studies above used KLD ratings prepared by MSCI Inc., which assesses 
companies according to their environmental, social and corporate governance 
performance (El Ghoul et al., 2001; Gregory et al., 2011b; Chava, 2010; Gregory et al., 
2011a; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008). By contrast, Chen et al. 
(2009) examined only the relationship between corporate governance and cost of 
equity capital in firms in 17 emerging markets (559 firm-year observations, 2001-2002). 
They provided evidence that higher level of corporate governance reduced a firm’s cost 
of equity capital, particularly in countries with weak legal protection. Chen et al. (2005) 
argued that a firm’s level of corporate governance and a country’s level of legal 
investor protection were substitutes for each other regarding the reduction of cost of 
equity capital. 
Hence, greater CSR disclosure levels can increase a firm’s cost of equity capital. 
Voluntary CSR disclosure in combination with superior CSR ratings is followed by a 
reduction in cost of equity capital which managers anticipate and seem to use by 
issuing new equity capital in the subsequent years. Lower ratings seem to be 
associated with lower cost of equity capital, and firms operating in sin industries may 
face higher cost of equity capital. Thus, environmental concerns might  as well 
negatively affect a firm’s implied cost of capital, but environmental strengths seem to 
have no effect on a firm’s expected stock returns. A valuation effect arising from high 
CSR ratings tends to lower a firm’s cost of equity capital and to intensify its persistence 
against expected adverse cash flow shocks; the latter emerges probably due to higher 
expected growth rates in abnormal earnings. Although higher CSR ratings may lead to 
higher levels of leverage, the cost of equity capital and WACC may decrease. 
Particularly the level of corporate governance seems to be negatively associated with 
cost of equity capital. 
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3.5 Risk Premium 
The cost of equity capital can be calculated differently (see 2.1.1 Cost of Capital). 
According to the CAPM, the cost of equity capital equals the risk free rate plus a risk 
premium. This risk premium is calculated by a market premium multiplied by a firm’s 
measure of systematic risk, called equity beta. Therefore, researchers use just equity 
beta as a measure of cost of equity capital too. 
Anderson and Frankle (1980) analysed the relationship between equity beta and 
voluntary social disclosure in 314 U.S. firms (1972-1973). They formed portfolios of 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms with equivalent systematic risk exposures for 
comparison. Empirical results provided evidence that markets valued voluntary social 
disclosure positively. Noteworthy, markets seemed not to distinguish between financial 
and non-financial information in social disclosures. Moreover, continuous disclosure 
was higher valued by the markets than initiations, with portfolios with higher betas 
having the greatest impact of continuity on valuation. 
Although Gregory et al. (2011c) conducted an empirical study investigating the 
relationship between firm’s equity beta and CSR ratings; they noted the problem of no 
clarity whether CSR exposure was actually a priced and systematic risk factor. 
Nevertheless, Gregory et al. found that high CSR ratings were associated with lower 
equity betas. Particularly high ratings in community, environment and diversity were 
most significant of all CSR areas for betas. Furthermore, they suggested that some of 
the observed differences in risk arose from industry effects. 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) also provided evidence of a negative relation between 
CSR ratings and equity beta with their study of WACC and environmental risk 
management. Corporate governance concerns were shown to be significantly 
associated with WACC. They argued that financial markets rewarded firms for better 
environmental risk management through lowering the volatility measure of their stocks 
– beta. Moreover, this negative relationship reflected on one hand resource efficiency 
and on the other hand the market’s perception of a firm’s risk profile. 
The same result of high CSR stocks having lower equity betas was obtained by 
Gregory et al. (2011b).The only exception was the CSR performance in respect to 
products for which they found a positive association; performances in all other areas, 
namely governance, diversity, employee and environment had a negative relation with 
a firm’s equity beta. 
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The results from El Ghoul et al. (2011) confirmed the previous results of a negative 
relationship between equity beta and CSR ratings. Although only used as a control 
variable, the results showed that equity beta and CSR scores had a negative6 and 
significant coefficient. Therefore, the authors concluded that firms with low CSR ratings 
had a higher perceived risk. 
Gregory et al. (2011c), Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Gregory et al. (2011b) and 
El Ghoul et al. (2011) used KLD data for the measurement of a firm’s CSR 
performance. However, there have also been studies using ratings from other sources 
or even just the SIC codes for allocating firms to ―sin industries‖. For example, McGuire 
et al. (1988) used ratings on corporate reputation from Fortune magazine’s annual 
survey. They examined the effect of CSR performance on a firm’s financial and 
accounting performance. Financial risk measures, exempli gratia beta, showed 
negative correlations with CSR ratings for both, financial performance prior CSR 
ratings as well as CSR ratings prior financial performance. However, their results also 
showed that accounting-based risk measures, exempli gratia operating leverage, had a 
greater explanatory power than beta. McGuire et al. suggested that CSR performance 
was ―predominantly unsystematic‖ (p. 868) and while beta reflected mainly systematic 
risk, accounting measures reflected unique, unsystematic firm risk. Thus, the 
relationship between accounting-based risk measures and CSR performance seemed 
to be stronger. 
Focused on one industry, Spicer (1978) analysed the relationship between CSR 
performance and a firm’s risks in the U.S. pulp and paper industry (18 firms) from 1968 
until 1973. He found negative associations between CSR performance and total risk as 
well as systematic risk (beta). In particular, firms with better pollution controls had lower 
total and systematic risk. However, the significant associations disappeared over time. 
He suggested that this diminution might emerge from the fact that these kinds of 
associations might just be ―relatively short-lived phenomena‖ (p. 109) arisen from 
public pressure. 
Another alternative classification of companies regarding their CSR performance is 
according to industries through their SIC codes. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) used 
SIC codes for identifying firms in so called ―sin industries‖, namely alcohol, tobacco and 
                                               
6
El Ghoul et al. (2011) actually stated a „positive and significant relationship― (p.2395) in their 
publication; however, the sign depends on the treatment of the underlying ratings for the 
statistical analysis. 
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gaming. Although they found evidence that firms in sin industries had higher expected 
returns than comparable firms in other industries, there was no effect from sin 
industries on beta. 
All the above presented studies were conducted with samples of U.S. firms. Thus, 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) raised the question whether the results of a significant 
negative relationship between equity betas and the level of environmental risk 
management still held in countries with higher pressure on firms for improving their 
environmental risk management, such as Australia or in Europe. Ziegler et al. (2002) 
examined the relationship between CSR performance and equity beta of 214 European 
companies. Like Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Ziegler et al. (2002) found a positive 
significant relationship between a firms’ CSR performance and its stock return, but no 
significant association between CSR performance and beta. 
An empirical study of 451 UK firms was conducted by Brammer et al. (2006). Apart 
from a negative relationship between corporate social performance and financial 
performance (see 3.3 Stock Market Returns), they found no significant correlation 
between CSR performance and beta. Brammer et al. (2006) argued that standard risk-
based models could not reveal an explanation for the great differences in returns 
between high and low CSR rated firms. 
Furthermore, Bassen et al. (2006) carried out another more international empirical 
study. They analysed the effect of CSR ratings on the risk profiles of 44 utility 
companies from 23 developed countries (2000-2005). Although no significant 
association between CSR and financial performance could be found, an indirect link 
through company risk was proven. More precisely, their results showed a significant 
negative relationship between CSR performance and beta. In addition, results provided 
evidence that CSR performance had explanatory power for credit ratings, a measure of 
default risk, too. Bassen et al. (2006) concluded that high levels of CSR performance 
reduced a firm’s risk exposure. 
A global analysis was conducted by Lee and Faff (2009). Their sample comprised 
2,500 firms from 34 countries and 5 years (1998-2002). They used the DJSI as CSR 
performance measure and the Dow Jones Global Index (DJGI), which included all DJSI 
firms, as firm selection for the whole sample. Although the high CSR portfolio did not 
underperform the market portfolio, the low CSR portfolio outperformed the market and 
the CSR portfolio. However, Lee and Faff found that firms with high levels of CSR 
performance faced significantly lower idiosyncratic – not systematic – risk than firms 
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with low levels. Further, their results showed that idiosyncratic risk had significant 
explanatory power for the difference in stock performance between high and low CSR 
rated firms.  
Hence, voluntary social disclosure as well as CSR ratings and equity beta tend to be 
negatively correlated. Higher levels of environmental responsibility and corporate 
governance can reduce a firm’s risk profile and hence equity beta. Although CSR 
performance and beta are negatively associated, accounting-based risk measures 
seem to have better explanatory power regarding CSR. The fact that a firm is in a sin 
industry seems to have no effect on its beta. Unlike firms in the U.S., firms in Europe 
do not show a significant association between CSR performance and beta, the same 
holds true for a study of solely UK firms. On one hand, an international analysis for 
firms in the utility industry has shown that CSR performance and beta are negatively 
and highly correlated. On the other hand, a global cross-industry study has provided 
evidence that idiosyncratic, and not systemic risk, can explain the financial 
performance difference between high and low rated firms. Spicer (1978) raised the 
question whether the valuation effect of CSR performance on a firms risk profile was 
just not short-lived and better reflected the current Zeitgeist. 
3.6 Meta-analyses 
The above subchapters presented individual empirical research studies on the 
relationship between CSR performance and financial performance, either based on 
figures from stock markets or accounting. They showed a lot of inconclusive results – 
finding significant positive, negative,  non-significant or no relationships at all. A meta-
analysis, might shed more light on the issue. The main advantage of such an analysis 
is that sampling errors can be reduced and the sample covers a longer time period and 
more industries and countries. 
This was the purpose of the study by Orlitzky et al.(2003), who conducted a meta-
analysis comprising 52 studies, 33,878 observations with a time frame of 26 years 
(1972-1997). Six of the above 37 presented studies, have been also included in this 
meta-analysis. The results showed a significant positive relationship between financial 
and CSR performance across industries and study contexts. However, environmental 
performance had a much smaller correlation with financial performance than overall 
CSR or social performance. Furthermore, CSR and financial performance seemed to 
have simultaneous and bidirectional causality, hence, supporting the suggestions of 
Gregory et al. (2010) and Waddock and Graves (1997) of a virtuous circle. Orlitzky et 
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al. (2003) argued that this in turn supported the theories of instrumental stakeholders 
and of slack resources. Their results also showed that high CSR performance 
increased reputation and goodwill, though the reputation effect was rather small. 
Overall, the authors conclude that financial performance based on accounting figures, 
rather than on stock market measures, tended to be higher correlated with CSR 
performance. This finding was additionally supported by the empirical evidence from 
Gregory et al. (2011c) (see 3.5 Risk Premium). 
Another meta-analysis carried-out by Margolis et al. (2007) comprised 167 studies over 
a time period of 36 years (1972-2007). Ten of the above 37 presented studies, were 
also included in this meta-analysis. Their empirical study provided evidence that CSR 
and financial performance were positively associated. This link was strongest for 
environmental performance, charitable contributions and revealed misdeeds. This 
association was also found by Cohen et al. (1997), Sharfman and Fernando (2008), 
Brammer and Millington (2008), Lev et al. (2010), as well as Rao (1996), Gregory et al. 
(2011c), Gregory et al. (2011b) and Chava (2010), respectively. Moreover, the link was 
weakest for corporate policies and transparency. However, the effect was smaller in 
respect to increased financial performance following CSR performance, and stronger 
for high financial performance prior CSR performance. Margolis et al. (2007) argued 
that the weak effect on subsequent financial performance could be due to avoidance of 
a firm to get socially criticised, but was still low enough not to incur great costs. They 
explained the latter (stronger) effect through free cash flows, which were in their 
opinion wasted investments. Overall, the authors found no systematic negative effect of 
CSR on financial performance. They suggested, that the steady interest in searching a 
possible association between CSR and financial performance might root in the need of 
business leaders to justify CSR costs and the effort to find a ―deeper purpose that 
business serves for society‖ while suspending or violating the duty of pursuing a firm’s 
financial objectives. 
Hence, both meta-analysis agree that corporate social performance helps to build a 
firm’s reputation and that there is a positive association between financial and CSR 
performance. However, in regard to environmental performance, there are inconclusive 
results. While Orlitzky et al. (2003) has found evidence for environmental performance 
having a much smaller correlation with financial performance, Margolis et al. (2007) 
has shown contrary evidence. They seem to disagree in respect to causality as well. 
On one hand, Orlitzky et al. (2003) has found a bidirectional and simultaneous 
influence, like a virtuous circle, whereas Margolis et al. (2007) only has found a ―mild‖ 
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effect of prior CSR performance on subsequent financial performance, and a much 
stronger one in the opposite direction. Moreover, both studies seem to agree that 
financial resources are necessary to engage or improve CSR performance and support 
the slack resource or free cash flow theory respectively. Overall, Orlitzky et al. (2003) 
concluded that financial performance, measured with accounting rather than stock 
market figures, had a higher significant correlation with CSR ratings. By contrast, 
Margolis et al. (2007) argued that the association between CSR and financial 
performance was rather weak and encouraged the investigation of the behaviour 
behind CSR performance. 
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4 Hypotheses 
After presenting theoretical approaches and related studies regarding CSR 
performance and cost of equity capital, two hypothesis will be discussed for the 
empirical study. The first will examine the impact of CSR ratings on equity beta, while 
the second will assess a possible relation between CSR ratings and stock liquidity. 
4.1 Capital Markets Reward High CSR-Rated Firms With Lower 
Betas 
The theories and empirical studies presented in the preceding chapters suggest that 
CSR activities enhance the long-term value of a firm. Furthermore, CSR disclosure 
reduces information risk due to a higher degree of transparency. The reduction of 
uncertainty also lowers the premium required from capital markets. Particularly the 
commitment to CSR disclosure decreases a firm’s cost of capital. More analysts get 
attracted by more information available; they perceive CSR as value creating strategy 
and hence, they are more likely to recommend firms with higher CSR performance. 
Various studies, including Gregory et al. (2010), Sharfman and Fernando (2008), 
Gregory et al. (2011a), McGuire et al. (1988), as well as El Ghoul et al. (2011) have 
already provided empirical evidence that equity beta is significantly negatively 
correlated with CSR ratings. 
Based on the previously presented theoretical and empirical studies, the first 
hypothesis of the empirical analysis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Capital markets reward high CSR-rated firms with lower cost of 
equity capital, measured by equity beta. 
4.2 CSR Reporting Firms Enjoy Increased Stock Liquidity 
CSR ratings are based on publicly disclosed information from the company. Thus, with 
higher levels of CSR disclosures the information asymmetry between management and 
investors declines (see 2.2.3 Costs and Benefits of CSR). Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
showed that voluntary disclosure increases stock liquidity. Moreover, institutional 
investors get increasingly under pressure to invest in SRI stocks and thus increase 
liquidity of these stocks. Hence, the second hypothesis of the empirical analysis is: 
Hypothesis 2: CSR reporting firms enjoy increased stock liquidity. 
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5 Dataset and Methodology 
In this chapter all the data and methodology used for the empirical study to test the 
above discussed hypotheses will be presented. First, the sample for both hypotheses 
will be described. Second, the dependent variable for measuring cost of equity capital 
and liquidity will be presented, as well as the influencing variables, id est. CSR ratings 
and control variables. Third, the statistical methods, namely a linear regression model 
as well as a variance analysis, will be outlined. 
5.1 Sample Description 
The empirical study originally aimed at investigating a possible relationship between 
cost of equity capital and CSR ratings of Austrian and German stock listed firms; 
however, due to methodological constraints, only the German firms were included in 
the final sample. The composition of the sample depended on the data provided by a 
rating agency, oekom research AG. 
5.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility Performance 
Most of the studies presented in chapter 3 used ratings on environment, social and 
governance performance (KLD ratings) from MSCI Inc as a CSR performance 
measurement. However, due to the fact that the sample was supposed to comprise 
only German and Austrian companies, a German rating agency, oekom research AG, 
was asked to provide its ratings. oekom research AG was very cooperative and 
disclosed top level scores of Austrian and German companies per June 30, 2012 for 
this master thesis. 
Generally, oekom research AG evaluates around 3,100 companies covering major 
indexes as the MSCI world index, MSCI emerging markets index, Stoxx 600, but also 
ATX (Austrian stock exchange index) and DAX (German stock exchange index). 
However, firms in ―sin industries‖, id est firms operating in controversial business areas 
or with controversial business practices, are not evaluated; controversial business 
areas include: abortion, alcohol, biocides, chlororganic mass products, embryonic 
research, furs, gambling, genetically modified organisms, military, nuclear power, 
pornography and tobacco. Controversial business practices comprise: animal testing, 
business malpractice, child labour, controversial environmental practices as well as 
human and labour rights violations. Leading firms regarding CSR ratings within their 
respective industries, which meet a specific minimum of criteria receive the oekom 
research prime status, which were about 550 firms per June 30, 2012. Furthermore, 
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oekom research AG has its own Global Challenges Index (GCX) with the 50 globally 
active companies and SMEs that promote sustainable development. Twelve of these 
50 firms are from Germany (10) and Austria (2) (oekoem research AG, 2012). 
oekom research AG follows the ―Frankfurt-Hohenheims Guidelines‖ for the ethical 
assessment criteria and rates a firm’s social, cultural and environmental sustainability. 
Information for their ratings come from annual and sustainability reports, interviews with 
firm representatives and independent experts, media screening as well as 
assessments from independent specialists. The ratings cover the following six main 
areas: 1) employees and suppliers, 2) society and product responsibility, 3) corporate 
governance and business ethics, 4) environmental management, 5) products and 
services, and 6) eco-efficiency. While the first three (1-3) criteria are social 
performance criteria, the latter three (4-6) are environmental criteria. The ratings are on 
a twelve-scale from A+ with ―extraordinary performance‖ to D- ―little 
engagement‖(oekom research AG 2012).  
Overall, oekom research AG rated 141 German (114) and Austrian (27) firms per 
June 30, 2012. However, not all of these rated companies are also listed on a stock 
exchange and hence, 30 firms had to be excluded from the sample. The ratings 
(RATING) of these Austrian and German firms ranged from A to C-. In addition to the 
twelve-scale ratings, oekom research AG defined four groups: excellent (A+, A, A-), 
good (B+, B, B-), medium (C+, C, C-) and poor (D+, D, D-) (oekom research AG, 
2012). 
Moreover, oekom research AG differentiates between different industries and hence, 
puts different weights on social and environmental ratings for different industries for the 
overall corporate rating (oekom research AG 2012). 
5.1.2 Financial Performance 
Equity beta was used to measure cost of equity capital. The sample had to be reduced 
to German companies for least influence by country characteristics. However, the 
exclusion of 15 Austrian firms did not reduce the sample considerably. Thus the final 
sample consisted of 94 German companies. 
The data for leverage of four German firms was not available for the specific time 
period in the Bloomberg database. Hence, for the regression analyses with control 
variables, the sample size was reduced to 90 firms. The other parameters serving as 
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control variables – namely size, liquidity and industry – were available for all firms, and 
thus, did not affect sample size. 
5.1.3 Sample Characteristics 
The final sample comprised 94 German firms listed on a stock exchange in Germany. 
More than half of the sample firms (52) were companies with large market 
capitalisation values (―large caps‖), which were part of a leading international/national 
share index. The remaining 42 firms had small to medium market capitalisation values, 
but according to oekom research AG significantly contributed to sustainability 
development. Furthermore, ten of the sample firms were included in the Global 
Challenges Index by oekom research AG (see chapter 5.1.1). 
oekom research AG also provided an industry classification. The sample covered 36 
different industries with one to four firms being assigned to each industry. The only 
exception was the industry ―renewable energy and energy efficiency‖ comprising one 
third of the sample (31 firms). 
Detailed sample description, id est descriptive statistics of equity beta, ratings, as well 
as size, liquidity and leverage will be provided in chapter 6.1 Study Sample 
Characteristics. 
5.2 Description of Variables 
Cost of equity capital might be influenced by CSR performance, thus equity beta was 
used as dependent variable and CSR ratings as influencing variable. Other factors can 
influence equity beta, like measures of leverage, liquidity and size as well as industry 
dummies, these were used as control variables. The measure for liquidity was further 
used for the second analysis to investigate a possible association between CSR ratings 
and liquidity too.  
5.2.1 Cost of Equity Capital 
Equity beta was used as the measure of firms’ cost of equity capital. More precisely, 
the two-year average equity betas from Bloomberg were used. Bloomberg averages 
the weekly raw equity beta (104) to calculate the two-year average. The time period for 
the calculation is June 30, 2010 until June 30, 2012. 
The advantage of using equity beta instead of any other measure of cost of equity 
capital is that it is not heavily relying on analyst forecasts and easily comparable. 
Calculating the cost of equity capital by using CAPM and equity beta would bear too 
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many uncertainties about the market premium and risk free rate for Austria and 
Germany. Therefore, equity beta (BETA) was used for measuring cost of equity capital 
for better comparability.  
5.2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility Ratings 
oekom research AG rates companies from the best grade A+ to D-. In order to properly 
perform regression analyses, numbers were assigned to each rating grade in an 
ascending order (1 for A+, 12 for D-). This is particularly important to be kept in mind 
when interpreting the results. 
For a robustness test, ratings were grouped (RATING_GR) and used for another 
regression analysis. Due to the fact that only end ratings were available, no in-depth 
analysis of individual rating components have been performed.  
5.2.3 Control Variables 
Since a firm’s equity beta is also influenced by other factors such as leverage and 
liquidity, the following four control variables were included in the regression analysis: 
Leverage 
Leverage has a direct effect on a firm’s cost of equity capital, as an increased debt to 
equity ratio increases a firm’s default risk and hence increases its cost of equity capital 
too (see 2.1.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model and Cost of Equity Capital). Bhandari (1988) 
suggested that leverage is a proxy for equity risk. In addition, Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009), El Ghoul et al. (2011) as well as Sharfman and Fernando (2008) used leverage 
as a control variable in their examination of a relationship between equity beta and 
CSR performance. 
Hence, in the empirical study leverage (LEVERAGE), measured as total debt to 
common equity per June 30, 2012 from Bloomberg database, was used as control 
variable. 
Firm Size 
The size of a firm can have an important effect on a firm’s capital costs. Banz (1981) 
found that firm size influences cost of capital due to the fact that of small firms less 
information is available. Moreover, Fama and French (1993) stated that returns of small 
firms are much more variable than of larger firms. Besides, according to Waddock and 
Graves (1997) there is evidence that smaller firms do not overtly show as much CSR 
behaviour compared to larger firms. Moreover, larger firms generally have more 
 
 
5 Dataset and Methodology 
 
 
43 
 
resources to invest in CSR (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008). There are various ways to 
measure a firm’s size. Bassen et al. (2006) as well as Waddock and Graves (1997) 
used the number of employees as the size control variable. In comparison, El Ghoul et 
al. (2011) and Spicer (1978) measured a firm’s size as the natural logarithm of total 
assets, whereas Sharfman and Fernando (2008) controlled for firm size with market 
capitalisation from Bloomberg database. Around half of all studies included in Margolis 
et al.’s meta analysis (2007) that used size as a control variable. 
Thus, for the empirical analysis, a control variable for size (SIZE) was used and 
measured with market capitalisation per June 30, 2012 from Bloomberg database. 
Liquidity 
When a firm is more liquid, its beta is lower too (see 2.1.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
and Cost of Equity Capital). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggested that liquidity is a 
good proxy for beta. Hence, when examining the relationship between beta and CSR 
performance, liquidity is an important control variable. For example Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011) used liquidity, measured as number of traded shares over total shares 
outstanding. 
In the regression analysis, the control variable liquidity (LIQUIDITY) was measured as 
the ratio of trading volume to total equity shares outstanding per June 30, 2012 from 
Bloomberg database. 
Industry Classification 
Firms in different industries might systemically face different costs of capital (Sharfman 
and Fernando, 2008). Furthermore, some differences in risk, reflected in beta, may be 
due to industry effects (Gregory et al., 2010). According to Margolis et al. (2007), 75 of 
the examined 167 studies from their meta-analysis used control variables for industries. 
Industry dummies (INDUSTRY) were included in the regression analysis to control for 
such industry effects. The industry classification was used according to the 
classification of oekom research AG, consisting of 35 different industries (see 
Appendix 1: List of Industries). 
5.2.4 Stock Liquidity 
Cheng et al. (2012) stated that we need to understand how capital markets perceive 
and value volunteer CSR initiatives. Hence, another interesting research question that 
was developed asked whether firms with high CSR performance were preferred by 
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markets than those with lower performance. This could be measured in various ways, 
exempli gratia in terms of trading activity, or more precisely liquidity. None of the 
previously conducted studies presented in chapter 3 or included in the meta-analysis 
performed by Margolis et al. (2007) examined the relationship between liquidity and 
CSR ratings. 
Thus, in addition to the examination of the link between CSR ratings and equity beta, a 
regression analysis was conducted to investigate a possible relationship between CSR 
ratings and liquidity. The liquidity measure (LIQUIDITY) used as a control variable in 
the first regression – ratio of the number of traded shares to total shares outstanding – 
was used as the dependent variable for the second analysis. 
5.3 Statistical Methods 
In order to test the in chapter 4 described hypotheses, a linear regression model was 
applied for investigating a possible association between CSR ratings and equity beta 
as well as liquidity. Furthermore, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
test the difference in means of the dependent variables between the three rating 
groups included in the sample. A level of significance with five percent was assumed. 
All statistical analyses were carried out with the help of the PAWS Statistics software 
(Version 18 for Windows). 
5.3.1 Cost of Equity Capital: Beta 
First, a linear regression with equity beta (BETA) as dependent variable and CSR 
rating (RATING) as influencing variable without any control variables was performed. 
Another linear regression but with additional influencing variables controlling for 
leverage (LEVERAGE), size (SIZE), liquidity (LIQUIDITY) and industry effects 
(INDUSTRY) was carried out. As a robustness test, a linear regression with the same 
dependent and control variables, but with group ratings (RATING_GR) instead of 
individual ratings (RATING), was conducted. 
Moreover, a oneway ANOVA for the variables beta (BETA), leverage (LEVERAGE), 
size (SIZE) and liquidity (LIQUIDITY) in regard to group ratings (RATING_GR) was 
conducted. In case of non-homogeneity of variances, results were Welch-corrected. A 
post-hoc Tukey Test was performed to further investigate significant differences found 
in the ANOVA. Due to the fine classifications of industries – 90 firms in 35 different 
industries –,  the industry dummies were omitted for the ANOVA. 
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5.3.2 Stock Liquidity 
In addition to examining the correlation between CSR ratings and equity beta, a 
possible association between CSR ratings and liquidity was investigated. This was 
done by means of a linear regression, with liquidity (LIQUIDITY) as the dependent 
variable and CSR rating (RATING) as the influencing variable. Unlike the regression 
with beta, for this analysis no control variables were used. 
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6 Results 
In this chapter the results of the empirical study will be presented. First, sample 
characteristics for both hypotheses will be displayed. Second, the regression analyses 
regarding equity beta will be presented, followed by the results of the ANOVA. Finally, 
the results of the investigation of a possible association between CSR ratings and 
liquidity will be depicted. 
6.1 Study Sample Characteristics 
Overall there have been four variables and 35 dummy variables used for the regression 
analyses. The total sample consisted of 94 firms, though for the analyses with all 
control variables the sample size has been reduced to 90 due to missing data for the 
variable LEVERAGE. In the following table (Table 1), the descriptive statistics of the 
sample are summarised: 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of BETA, SIZE, LIQUIDITY and LEVERAGE 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N Minimum Maximum 
BETA .6845 .41917 94 -.10 1.81 
SIZE 7.2668E9 1.33725E10 94 32.95 6.05E10 
LIQUIDITY 1.0995 .91088 94 .00 4.70 
LEVERAGE 220.1515 399.78651 90 2.06 2154.09 
Valid values   90   
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of individual ratings among the sample firms. While 
column 2 and 3 refer to the total sample, column 4 and 5 refer to the reduced sample. 
Only a few firms had top (A) and bottom ratings (C-) . Almost half of the firms were 
either rated B- or C+. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of RATINGS 
 n % 
valid A+ 0 0.0 
A 1 1.1 
A- 6 6.4 
B+ 12 12.8 
B 11 11.7 
B- 20 21.3 
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 n % 
C+ 24 25.5 
C 17 18.1 
C- 3 3.2 
 
D+ 0 0.0 
 
D 0 0.0 
 
D- 0 0.0 
 
total 94 100.0 
 
In addition, Table 3 displays the distribution of group ratings. Like individual ratings, 
most firms had neither top (excellent) nor bottom (poor) ratings. The rating groups 
―good‖ and ―medium‖ were nearly equally often presented. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of RATING_GR 
 n % 
valid excellent 7 7.4 
good 43 45.7 
medium 44 46.8 
poor 0 0.0 
 
total 94 100.0 
 
6.2 Cost of Equity Capital: Beta 
In this subchapter, the results of the following three linear regression analyses will be 
presented: first, with individual CSR ratings but without control variables; second, with 
individual ratings and all four control variables; third, with group ratings and all four 
control variables. Moreover, the results of an ANOVA for the group ratings will be 
displayed. 
6.2.1 Linear Regression without Control Variables 
At first, a linear regression was performed with equity beta(BETA) as the dependent 
variable and CSR ratings(RATING) as influencing variable. Table 4 shows the basic 
statistical characteristics of the sample. All 94 observations were included in the 
sample. BETA had a mean of 0.6845 and RATING a mean of 6.1064 (equivalent to B-). 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of linear regression (without control variables) 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
BETA .6845 .41917 94 
RATING 6.1064 1.62949 94 
 
The results of the regression analysis, presented in table 5, showed a significant 
positive correlation between the two variables. Also the regression coefficient was, 
although only slightly positive, statistically significant. Importantly, the signs must be 
interpreted the other way around, taking into account that the best possible rating A+ 
was assigned number 1 and the worst D- number 12. Hence, the better a firm’s CSR 
rating, the lower its equity beta. It must be noted that based on these results a causality 
cannot be interpreted. 
Table 5: Correlations and regression coefficients (without control variables) 
 
Correlations Regression 
coefficient
a
 BETA RATING 
Pearson correlation BETA .386 1.000 . 
RATING 1.000 .386 .099 
Significance BETA .000 . . 
RATING . .000 .000 
a. Dependent variable: BETA 
 
6.2.2 Linear Regression with Control Variables 
A second linear regression with the four control variables was performed. Table 6 
displays the basic statistical characteristics of the reduced sample as well as all control 
variables, excluding the 35 industry dummies. The mean of BETA was 0.6856 and of 
RATING 6.1000 (equivalent to B-). 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of linear regression (with control variables) 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
BETA .6856 .42733 90 
RATING 6.1000 1.64248 90 
SIZE 7.3331E9 1.35081E10 90 
LIQUIDITY 1.1026 .90840 90 
LEVERAGE 220.1515 399.78651 90 
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After controlling for LEVERAGE, SIZE, LIQUIDITY and industry effects (INDUSTRY), 
the correlation between equity beta and CSR ratings remained unchanged – positive 
and significant (see Table 7). However, the regression coefficient was(though positive) 
statistically not significant. As expected, the results showed that SIZE and LIQUIDITY 
strongly affected BETA. While size had a negative influence, liquidity had a positive 
influence. Therefore, in respect to the study sample, CSR ratings had no explanatory 
power for equity beta, but were moderately positively correlated. 
Table 7: Correlations and regression coefficients (with control variables) 
 
6.2.3 Linear Regression with Group Ratings and Control Variables 
For a robustness check, rating grades were grouped according to the classification by 
oekom research AG. Besides, eleven, or rather eight represented, rating grades were a 
lot for a sample of 90 firms. 
Table 8 depicts the basic statistical characteristics without industry dummies. Group 
ratings (RATING_GR) had a mean of 2.3889 (equivalent to ―good‖). 
 
 
 
Correlations Regression 
coefficient
a
 BETA RATING SIZE LIQUIDITY LEVERAGE 
Pearson Correlation BETA 1.000 .388 .332 -.047 .498 . 
RATING .388 1.000 .182 .145 -.041 .053 
SIZE .332 .182 1.000 .073 .101 1.190E-11 
LIQUIDITY .498 -.041 .101 -.024 1.000 .188 
LEVERAGE -.047 .145 .073 1.000 -.024 .000 
Significance BETA . .000 .001 .331 .000 . 
RATING .000 . .043 .086 .352 .121 
SIZE .001 .043 . .246 .171 .012 
LIQUIDITY .000 .352 .171 .410 . .000 
LEVERAGE .331 .086 .246 . .410 .037 
a.  Dependent variable: BETA; Additional control variables: INDUSTRY 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for regression analysis (group ratings) 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
BETA .6856 .42733 90 
SIZE 7.3331E9 1.35081E10 90 
LIQUIDITY 1.1026 .90840 90 
LEVERAGE 220.1515 399.78651 90 
RATING_GR 2.3889 .63058 90 
 
Table 9 shows the results of the regression analysis for group ratings and equity beta. 
Alike with individual ratings, RATING_GR and BETA were positively and significantly 
correlated. LIQUIDITY and SIZE were strongly positively and significantly correlated 
with BETA as well. However, controlling for size, liquidity, leverage and industry effects, 
no significant regression coefficient was revealed for RATING_GR and BETA. This 
finding showed that CSR ratings, no matter how finely or roughly classified, had no 
influence on equity beta but were significantly moderately positively correlated. Not 
surprisingly, the regression analysis confirmed a strong and significant influence of 
SIZE and LIQUIDITY on BETA. 
Table 9: Correlations and regression coefficients (group ratings) 
 
Correlations Regression 
coefficents
a
 BETA SIZE LIQUIDITY LEVERAGE RATING_GR 
Pearson 
correlation 
BETA 1.000 .332 .498 -.047 .316 . 
SIZE .332 1.000 .101 .073 .032 1.233E-11 
LIQUIDITY .498 .101 1.000 -.024 -.093 .195 
LEVERAGE -.047 .073 -.024 1.000 .125 .000 
RATING_GR .316 .032 -.093 .125 1.000 .151 
Significance BETA . .001 .000 .331 .001 . 
SIZE .001 . .171 .246 .381 .009 
LIQUIDITY .000 .171 . .410 .192 .000 
LEVERAGE .331 .246 .410 . .119 .049 
RATING_GR .001 .381 .192 .119 . .070 
a. Dependent variable: BETA; Additional control variables: INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Cost of Equity Capital: Beta 
 
 
52 
 
6.2.4 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The oneway ANOVA measured the homogeneity of means between the three rating 
groups. In Table 10, the results of the performed ANOVA are presented. The ANOVA 
showed significant differences in BETA between the three rating groups, but not in the 
other tested variables SIZE, LIQUIDITY and LEVERAGE. 
Table 10: Oneway ANOVA 
 Sums of squares df Mean squares F Significance 
SIZE Between groups 5,781E20 2 2,891E20 1,639 ,200 
Within groups 1,605E22 91 1,764E20   
Total 1,663E22 93    
LIQUIDITY Between groups 2,367 2 1,183 1,440 ,618* 
Within groups 74,795 91 ,822   
Total 77,162 93    
LEVERAGE Between groups 274111,165 2 137055,582 ,855 ,429 
Within groups 1,395E7 87 160352,788   
Total 1,422E7 89    
BETA Between groups 1,652 2 ,826 5,119 ,008 
Within groups 14,688 91 ,161   
Total 16,340 93    
 
Table 11 shows that only the means of the rating groups ―good‖ and ―medium‖ 
significantly differed from each other. There was no significant difference in means 
between the groups ―excellent‖ and ―good‖ nor ―excellent‖ and ―medium‖. However, 
group ―excellent‖ comprising less than ten percent of the sample is not really 
representative and, so the result has to be interpreted with caution. 
Table 11: Differences in means between rating groups 
Dependent 
variable 
(I) 
RATING_GR 
(J) 
RATING_GR 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Standard 
deviation 
Significance 
95%-confidence interval 
Lower limit Upper limit 
SIZE 
 
excellent 
 
good -9,26566E9 5,41317E9 ,206 -2,2163E10 3,6321E9 
medium -6,35009E9 5,40455E9 ,471 -1,9227E10 6,5271E9 
good 
 
excellent 9,26566E9 5,41317E9 ,206 -3,6321E9 2,2163E10 
medium 2,91557E9 2,84806E9 ,564 -3,8704E9 9,7015E9 
medium 
 
excellent 6,35009E9 5,40455E9 ,471 -6,5271E9 1,9227E10 
good -2,91557E9 2,84806E9 ,564 -9,7015E9 3,8704E9 
LIQUIDITY 
 
excellent 
 
good ,62700 ,36950 ,212 -,2534 1,5074 
medium ,54316 ,36891 ,309 -,3358 1,4222 
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Dependent 
variable 
(I) 
RATING_GR 
(J) 
RATING_GR 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Standard 
deviation 
Significance 
95%-confidence interval 
Lower limit Upper limit 
good 
 
excellent -,62700 ,36950 ,212 -1,5074 ,2534 
medium -,08384 ,19441 ,903 -,5470 ,3794 
medium 
 
excellent -,54316 ,36891 ,309 -1,4222 ,3358 
good ,08384 ,19441 ,903 -,3794 ,5470 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
excellent 
 
good -163,02048 163,76381 ,582 -553,5119 227,4710 
medium -210,96373 163,47925 ,404 -600,7767 178,8492 
good 
 
excellent 163,02048 163,76381 ,582 -227,4710 553,5119 
medium -47,94325 87,91454 ,849 -257,5737 161,6872 
medium 
 
excellent 210,96373 163,47925 ,404 -178,8492 600,7767 
good 47,94325 87,91454 ,849 -161,6872 257,5737 
BETA 
 
excellent 
 
good -,11289 ,16374 ,770 -,5030 ,2773 
medium -,35655 ,16348 ,080 -,7461 ,0330 
good 
 
excellent ,11289 ,16374 ,770 -,2773 ,5030 
medium -,24366
*
 ,08615 ,016 -,4489 -,0384 
medium 
 
excellent ,35655 ,16348 ,080 -,0330 ,7461 
good ,24366
*
 ,08615 ,016 ,0384 ,4489 
* Difference in means is significant (at level 0.05).  
 
6.2.5 Synopsis of Results 
The below table 12summarises the main results of the above described tests. 
Statistical significance is marked with two and one stars denoting one and five percent 
level of significance, respectively. The table shows that CSR ratings and equity beta 
were positively and significantly correlated, regardless of the composition of the 
analyses. However, after controlling for major influencing factors relating to beta, the 
positive regression coefficient between CSR ratings and equity beta was statistically 
non-significant. 
Table 12: Synopsis of results 
Type of Regression 
Correlation 
(beta-rating) 
Regression coefficient 
(beta-rating) 
Other significant 
coefficients 
Individual ratings, without control 
variables 
0.386 (0.000) 0.099 (0.000)  
Individual ratings, with control 
variables 
0.388 (0.000) 0.053 (0.121) 
Size (1.190E-11), 
liquidity (0.188), 
leverage (0.000) 
Group ratings, with control variables 0.316 (0.001) 0.151 (0.070) 
Size (1,233E-11), 
liquidity (0.195), 
leverage (0.000) 
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Type of Regression 
Correlation 
(liquidity-rating) 
Regression coefficient 
(liquidity-rating) 
 
Liquidity -0.032 (0.380) -0.018 (0.760)  
 
6.3 Stock Liquidity 
In addition to the examination of the relationship between CSR ratings and equity beta, 
a linear regression analysis was performed to investigate a possible association 
between CSR ratings and liquidity. This regression was carried out without control 
variables. Table 13 displays the basic statistical characteristics of the dependent 
variable, LIQUIDITY, and the influencing variable, RATING. The mean of LIQUIDITY 
was 1.0995 and the mean of RATING 6.1064 (equivalent to B-). 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for linear regression (RATING-LIQUIDITY) 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation N 
LIQUIDITY 1.0995 .91088 94 
RATING 6.1064 1.62949 94 
 
Table 14presents the regression analysis results for CSR ratings and liquidity. Although 
LIQUIDITY and RATING could have a positive association, there is neither a 
statistically significant correlation nor regression coefficient for the two variables. 
Hence, more liquid firms tend to have higher CSR ratings, but the results suggest that 
CSR ratings have no direct influence on a firm’s liquidity. 
Table 14: Correlations and regression coefficients (RATING-LIQUIDITY) 
 Correlations Regression 
coefficient  LIQUIDITY RATING 
Pearson correlation LIQUIDITY 1.000 -.032 . 
RATING -.032 1.000 -.018 
Significance LIQUIDITY . .380 . 
RATING .380 . .760 
a. Dependent variable: LIQUIDITY 
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter the results of the empirical analysis presented in the preceding chapter 
(see 6 Results) will be discussed and interpreted, followed by a critical assessment of 
the study. This chapter and the thesis will be closed with concluding remarks. 
7.1 Discussion of the Results 
The results presented in chapter 6 Results will be discussed in detail with referring to 
theoretical approaches addressed in chapter 2 Theoretical Background as well as to 
related studies introduced in chapter 3 Related Research. 
7.1.1 Cost of Equity Capital: Beta 
Tree similar linear regression analyses were conducted: 1) one with individual CSR 
ratings and without control variables, 2) one with individual ratings and control 
variables, and 3) one with grouped CSR ratings and control variables. Moreover, an 
ANOVA for individual ratings and control variables was performed. 
Linear Regression without Control Variables 
The results, showing a significant negative relationship7 between CSR ratings and 
equity beta, would suggest that firms with high levels of CSR performance enjoy low 
equity betas and hence, low cost of equity capital. Moreover, the highly significant 
coefficient could indicate that an increase in a firm’s CSR rating could lower its equity 
beta. These results would support the results of most of the previously presented 
studies (Anderson and Frankel, 1980; Gregory et al., 2010; Sharfman and Fernando, 
2008; Gregory et al.; 2011a; El Ghoul et al., 2011; McGuire et al., 1988; Spicer, 1978; 
and Bassen et al., 2006).  
However, these results have to be interpreted with caution, because no control variable 
has been used, which possibly could affect beta and override the explanatory power of 
CSR ratings. As the results of the second regression show, this was exactly the case in 
my study. 
                                               
7
 Due to the assignment of numbers to the ratings, the signs in front of the results have to be 
viewed the other way around – a positive relationship is supposed to be a negative and vice 
versa. 
 
 
7.1 Discussion of the Results 
 
 
56 
 
Linear Regression with Control Variables 
After controlling for leverage, liquidity, firm size and industry effects, the results for CSR 
ratings have changed remarkably. Although the correlations between equity beta and 
ratings have remained highly significant and modest, the regression coefficient has 
become statistically non-significant. Firm size and liquidity have yielded sizeable and 
significant negative correlations as well as regression coefficients. Whereas leverage 
and equity beta had positive but not statistically significant correlations and no 
significant regression coefficient. 
Thus, these results do not support the main tenor that there is a negative relationship 
between CSR ratings and equity beta. However, they support some of the studies 
presented in chapter 3 (see 3.5 Risk Premium); exempli gratia by Ziegler et al. (2002) 
who found no effect from CSR ratings on beta, or Brammer et al. (2006) who could not 
detect any correlation between ratings and beta. Lee and Faff (2009) could not find a 
relationship between beta and ratings in their study neither. In respect to leverage, also 
Fama and French (1993) provided empirical evidence that leverage has no explanatory 
power for equity beta, when tested in combination with firm size and book-to-market 
ratio (see 2.1..2 Capital Asset Pricing Model and Cost of Equity Capital). Thus, the 
results of this thesis’ study are not unexpected. 
Moreover, not all studies have used control variables or just not as many as this thesis’ 
study. Although, in all twelve analyses it has been controlled for size, none controlled 
for liquidity. Industry effects, leverage and book-to-market ratio have been taken into 
account infrequently. According to the meta analysis conducted by Margolis et al. 
(2007), less than half of the investigated studies have used size or industry effects as a 
control variables. Moreover, no study has considered leverage or liquidity as 
influencing factors in their analyses. 
Regarding CSR ratings, it has to be said that five of the eight studies supporting a 
negative relationship between equity beta and CSR ratings have been conducted with 
KLD ratings. All presented studies with KLD data found significant relationships. 
However, it can therefore not be concluded that one CSR rating is better than the other 
one or biased in regard to beta. Also the ratings used in this thesis’ study might include 
some sort of bias. oekom research AG uses certain exclusion criteria and hence, does 
not take into account certain industries (see 5.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Performance). Therefore, the study sample did not cover all industries, id est the whole 
market. Moreover, not all ratings and/or rating groups have been equally represented in 
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the sample. Only less than ten percent of the sample firms were rated excellent (A- and 
above); no poor-rated firm (D+ and lower) have been included in the sample. 
There might be some country bias in the conducted studies too. Seven of the eight 
studies supporting a correlation have been performed with data of U.S. firms. No study 
not exclusively using U.S. firm data has found a significant correlation. Exempli gratia 
Ziegler et al. (2002) has conducted a study with European firms and found no effect on 
beta; Brammer et al. (2006) has used UK firm data and identified no correlation; and 
Lee and Faff (2009) have not supported a relation with their international firm sample 
neither. Hence, it might be possible that mainly U.S. capital markets perceive high 
levels of CSR performance as risk reducing activities. Though, according to this data, 
only assumptions can be made. Since different data sources have been used for 
different geographical areas, comparisons have to be made with caution. 
Besides, Hail and Leuz (2006) have provided evidence that a significant relationship 
between equity beta and disclosure levels only exists for non-integrated markets. Thus, 
when assuming that primarily CSR disclosure is crucial for the ratings, this thesis’ 
results would confirm this finding as Germany counts to those countries with integrated 
markets. In addition, the disclosure argument would be generally irrelevant for 
Germany because firms face mandatory CSR disclosures anyhow (see 1 Introduction). 
Thus, I think that when all listed German firms are required by law to issue CSR 
information, the capital market has no rational reason to reward firms differently – when 
only assessing firms from Germany in isolated form. 
In my opinion, in Germany, CSR activities are highly regulated and/or controlled. 
Environmental issues are regulated by strict rules, social performances are tightly 
controlled by powerful labour unions and strong employee representatives, and 
possible governmental problems are treated in the German Corporate Governance 
Code (Deutscher Coporate Governance Kodex8). Hence, it is questionable whether 
there is any CSR activity beyond regulations that could be long-term firm value 
enhancing in Germany. 
Also Gregory et al. (2010) has raised the question whether CSR exposure is really 
priced by capital markets. They have argued that they were not sure about CSR 
exposure being a systemic risk factor and would be consequently reflected in equity 
betas. I think it is doubtful that firms are less exposed to market risk through higher 
                                               
8
See http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/ for more information. 
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levels of CSR performance to such an extent that equity betas are significantly lower; 
irrespective of type, industry, life cycle, size and capital structure. Due to their empirical 
results, Lee and Faff (2009) have suggested that CSR performance influences 
idiosyncratic, rather than systematic, risks of a firm – meaning that firm-specific and not 
market risk would be affected by CSR exposure. This in turn would not be measured by 
equity beta. Likewise, Brammer et al. (2006) have argued that standard risk-based 
models are not able to reveal explanations for the great differences in returns between 
low and high rated firms. 
In this context, maybe equity beta and cost of equity capital calculated with the CAPM 
would not be the appropriate measures. Brammer et al. (2006) has not found any 
evidence for a significant relationship between CSR ratings and equity beta, but for 
social and financial performance. Ziegler et al. (2002) has identified a link between 
stock returns and CSR ratings as well, but none for beta and ratings. Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) confirmed these results with CSR ratings being related to expected 
returns, rather than beta. 
Regarding equity beta being the appropriate measure for examining a possible link 
between financial and CSR performance, McGuire et al. (1988) stated that accounting-
based performance is stronger correlated with levels of CSR than market-based 
performance. Orlitzky et al. (2003), who conducted a meta analysis of 52 studies 
comprising 33,878 observations, support this view as well. They have argued that 
accounting figures tend to be higher correlated with CSR performance than stock 
market figures. 
In respect to the view of Greening and Turban (2000) that high levels of CSR 
performance can constitute a competitive advantage for a firm can neither be 
confirmed nor opposed by this thesis’ results. Since only ratings of one period have 
been used to test the two hypotheses, a study covering multiple periods would be 
qualified for making assumptions to this effect. A good reputation can be seen as one 
of a firm’s competitive advantages. Orlitzky et al. (2003) have suggested that the 
reputation effect of CSR activities is rather low. 
Linear Regression with Group Ratings and Control Variables 
The results from the linear regression with group ratings and control variables might be 
considered as a robustness check of the prior analysis with individual ratings. They 
confirm the above presented results of CSR ratings having a strong correlation but no 
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explanatory power on equity beta. Thus, CSR performance and beta go in the opposite 
direction, but some unknown third factor might influence them both. Therefore, the 
influence of CSR ratings on liquidity has been tested for the second hypothesis (see 
4.2 CSR Reporting Firms Enjoy Increased Stock Liquidity, and 7.1.2 Stock Liquidity). 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The ANOVA shows that neither in firm size, not liquidity or leverage, the means differ 
between the rating groups. For beta means, differences between the groups have been 
identified. However, only between group ―good‖ and ―medium‖ the differences have 
been significant. Since the mean difference features a negative sign in front of the 
result for group ―good‖, the mean betas for firms with ―medium‖ ratings were higher 
than for firms with ―good‖ ratings. 
Particularly the sample representativeness must be taken into account at this point. 
While the middle groups ―good‖ (B+, B, B-) and ―medium‖ (C+, C, C-) are 
approximately well-matched, the side groups ―excellent‖ (A+, A, A-) and ―poor‖ (D+, D, 
D-) are rarely or not at all represented, respectively. A more equally represented 
sample would have yielded more representative, id est more valid results in respect to 
external validity. 
7.1.2 Stock Liquidity 
In addition to examining the relationship between CSR ratings and equity beta, a linear 
regression for investigating a possible association between CSR ratings and liquidity 
has been carried out. While the results show a marginal positive relationship9 between 
ratings and liquidity, it is statistically non-significant. The regression coefficient between 
the two variables is non-significant as well. Thus, a firm’s CSR rating seems to have no 
influence on its liquidity. 
Since, to my knowledge, no such kind of analysis has been conducted yet, there are no 
results to be objectively compared to.  However, McGuire et al. (1988) as well as 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) both argued that accounting rather than stock market figures are 
correlated with CSR performance. Liquidity is a stock market-based performance 
measure. Thus, the results of both hypotheses of this thesis support the findings of 
McGuire et al. (1988) and Orlitzky et al (2003).  
                                               
9
Due to the assignment of numbers to the ratings, the signs in front of the results have to be 
viewed the other way around – a positive relationship is supposed to be a negative and vice 
versa. 
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The findings by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) showing that increased voluntary 
disclosure increases a firm’s liquidity would have suggested that higher CSR 
performance, which includes a higher level of transparency id est disclosure, would 
give rise to liquidity too. The authors have even used German firms for their empirical 
sample. However, they investigated reporting standards (national vs. international 
accounting standards), and they used bid-ask spreads to measure liquidity. That the 
market values and rewards international, hence, more comparable, reporting 
standards, is expectable. However, this finding is not transferable one by one to CSR 
disclosure or performance. 
Summarised, neither of the two hypotheses could be proven by the performed 
empirical study. CSR ratings seemed to have no influence; neither on a firm’s cost of 
equity capital, nor on liquidity. 
7.2 Critical Assessment of the Study 
The empirical study conducted for this thesis provides some evidence that CSR ratings 
have no statistically significant influence on cost of equity capital – measured by equity 
beta. In addition, CSR ratings seem not to influence a firm’s stock liquidity. 
One major advantage of this study is that not the usually used KLD ratings have been 
used, but from oekom research AG. First, since only German firms have been 
investigated, a rating agency from Germany might have better information access and 
is an expert of the German market in terms of relevant fields for CSR. Second, 
conducting similar studies based on the same data will always achieve similar results – 
different ratings might reduce or avoid certain bias from one agency. In addition, only a 
few studies have examined European firms; the majority used U.S. firms for their 
sample. 
However, the sample with 90 firms is rather small. This is due to the fact that only 
German stock listed companies, which had been rated by the rating agency, have been 
included. Thus, not international generalisation of the results for capital markets can be 
made, solely the German market is covered. Even for the German market the sample 
is not big, but its representativeness is average to good because most of the important 
industries are included.  
However, the sample faces some bias due to exclusion criteria from the rating agency. 
Certain industries – exempli gratia ―sin industries‖ – have been excluded from the list of 
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rated companies. Moreover, no firms rated ―poorly‖ have been represented in the data. 
Hence, the results definitely contain some upward bias. 
Another limitation is the investigated time frame. While most studies used multiple year 
observations for their studies, this thesis’ analysis covered solely one time period. 
Thus, the amount of firm-year observations for the same amount of firms is lower in my 
study. Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) have found that the perception of analysts 
regarding CSR performance had changed over time. While in earlier years, CSR 
performance had been treated as value destroying, analysts have started to appreciate 
and issue favourable recommendations for higher levels of CSR performance. Maybe 
the rewarding of high CSR performance in Europe/Germany is already diminished or is 
in a developing stage. A time series analysis with possible trend or development 
statements cannot be conducted with the used data in this thesis. 
It is also questionable whether the choice of equity beta was appropriate for testing the 
first hypothesis. On one hand, other measurements for cost of equity capital might be 
more descriptive than beta. On the other hand, two year average raw beta prior the 
rating instead of subsequent may not fully reflect a possible influence by the rating. 
Though, CSR performance is not expected to be highly volatile and hence, ratings are 
not expected to change remarkably. Thus, this limitation has been traded off for the 
most recent rating. 
Additionally, controlling for liquidity when testing a possible relationship between CSR 
ratings and equity beta has not been conducted before. However, the results show that 
liquidity has a significant explanatory power for equity beta and that they are strongly 
and significantly correlated. Therefore, liquidity should be taken into account when 
investigating associations with beta. 
A further contribution of the study is the analysis of the relationship between CSR 
ratings and liquidity. Although no control variables have been used, the insignificant 
correlation should not become significant when introducing other influencing variables. 
Thus, the argument that high levels of CSR performance increase a firm’s stock 
liquidity and this increase in turn lowers cost of equity capital cannot be supported, not 
even in the first instance. 
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7.3 Conclusion 
Theoretical approaches suggest that increased levels of CSR performance can 
improve a firm’s competitive advantage and reputation which in turn enhances firm 
value. Moreover, firms that demonstrate being highly social responsible may face 
higher litigation, competition and political costs. Though, CSR activities may reduce 
information asymmetries between management and stakeholders, hence decrease 
contracting costs, costs of conflicts as well as attract institutional investors and 
analysts. This in turn may give rise to stock liquidity and lowers cost of capital. 
Although theoretical frameworks supporting and also rejecting the view of CSR 
activities lowering a firm’s cost of capital, there have been various studies conducted 
providing empirical evidence of CSR activities as long-term firm value enhancing. They 
have showed that high levels of CSR performance may lower a firm’s financial 
constraints due to higher levels of disclosure and increased stakeholder commitment. 
Furthermore, CSR ratings seem to be negatively related with financial distress. In 
respect to profit, no correlation has been found. The inclusion of a firm in a 
sustainability index tends to heighten its share price permanently. Regarding stock 
returns as well as cost of equity capital, only inconclusive results have been achieved. 
Especially for equity beta, studies have showed inconclusive results. Mainly studies 
based on U.S. data have found significant relationships, while international and 
European based studies have a tendency to not confirm this finding. 
I think that due to the fact that this thesis’ empirical study could not confirm a 
statistically significant impact of CSR ratings on equity beta neither, CSR performance 
may affect a firm’s cost of capital indirectly. Particularly negative CSR disclosure, no 
matter by which party issued, can diminish firm value and stock prices. With high CSR 
performance the risk of negative CSR reputation can be decreased and hence, prevent 
a possible increase of cost of capital. Any time CSR activities come into effect for a 
specific occasion, it can be reflected in a firm’s financials. Moreover, financial 
performance and social performance might be interrelated.  
Based on the empirical results, no conclusion can be made about causality, meaning 
that for example CSR ratings influence equity beta. However, in regard of these 
empirical results, the hypothesis that capital markets reward firms for high CSR ratings 
with lower cost of equity capital cannot be confirmed. Nevertheless, a moderate 
negative correlation between the two variables has been found. I have wanted to 
contribute with this thesis a proof that high CSR performance can actually reduce a 
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firm’s cost of equity capital. But I doubt that high CSR performance itself can noticeably 
decrease a firm’s cost of equity capital after having examined all the above presented 
studies and conducting an empirical analysis myself. 
I would like to close this thesis with citing three Harvard professors who characterised 
the relationship between profitability and CSR activities as follows: ―... some firms 
generate long-term profits from some socially responsible activities some of the time...‖ 
(Reinhardt F., R. Stavins and R. Vietor, 2008, p. 31). 
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9 Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of Industries 
Aerospace & Defence 
Auto Components 
Automobile 
Chemicals 
Commercial Services & Supplies 
Construction 
Construction Materials 
Financials/Commercial Banks & Capital Markets 
Financials/Exchanges 
Financials/Mortgage & Public Sector Finance 
Health Care Equipment & Supplies 
Health Care Facilities & Services 
Household & Personal Products 
Industrial Conglomerates 
Insurance 
IT/Software & Services 
Leisure 
Machinery 
Media 
Metals & Mining 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
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Real Estate 
Recycling & Emissions Reduction 
Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency 
Retail 
Sustainable Finance 
Sustainable Food 
Sustainable Materials 
Sustainable Services 
Sustainable Transportation 
Telecommunications 
Textiles & Apparel 
Transport & Logistics 
Transport & Logistics/Rail 
Transportation Infrastructure 
Utilities 
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Appendix 3: Abstract (English) 
During the last two decades a remarkably growing number of sustainable and 
responsible investment products have emerged. Increasingly more countries have 
adapted laws requiring non-financial performance indicators to be disclosed too. 
Hence, the question arises whether capital markets reward corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) of firms. These rewards can be in form of lower cost of capital, 
particularly cost of equity capital. 
This thesis contributes to the extensive literature examining the pros and cons of CSR 
and a possible relationship between CSR and financial performance. An overview of a 
firm’s external financing options and cost of capital is presented. CSR is defined, 
including a discussion of a firm’s responsibility towards its shareholders and 
stakeholder, and costs and benefits of CSR. Furthermore, an extensive list of related 
research regarding CSR performance and financial performance is depicted. An 
empirical study follows, comprising a sample of German firms to test whether higher 
ratings negatively influence equity beta and positively influence liquidity. Overall, four 
linear regressions and an ANOVA are performed. 
The results showed a statistically significant negative correlation between CSR ratings 
and equity beta, even when controlling for firm size, liquidity, leverage and industry 
effects. However, when introducing the control variables, the regression coefficient 
becomes non-significant. Hence, CSR ratings seem not to have an influencing effect 
on equity beta. The same holds true for grouped CSR ratings. In addition, a possible 
relationship between CSR ratings and liquidity is tested. Similar to the findings 
regarding equity beta, the results suggest no influencing power of CSR ratings on stock 
liquidity. 
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Appendix 4: Abstract (German) 
Während der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte habensogenannte „Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment― Finanzprodukte ein bemerkenswertes Wachstum erlebt. Zunehmend mehr 
Länder haben Gesetze erlassen, um Firmen zu verpflichten, auch nicht-finanzielle 
Leistungsindikatoren offenzulegen.  Daher stellt sich die Frage, ob Kapitalmärkte 
soziale Verantwortung von Unternehmen („Corporate Social Responsibility―) belohnen. 
Diese Belohnung kann in Form von geringeren Kapitalkosten, insbesondere von 
Eigenkapitalkosten, erfolgen. 
Diese Magisterarbeit soll einen Beitrag leisten zur Erforschung der Vor- und Nachteile 
von Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),und eine mögliche Verbindung zwischen 
CSR und finanzieller Leistungsfähigkeit untersuchen. Zunächst gibt es einen Überblick 
über die externen Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten eines Unternehmens und dessen 
Kapitalkosten. Es folgt die Definition von CSR, einschließlich einer Diskussion über die 
Verantwortung eines Unternehmens gegenüber seinen Kapitaleignern („Shareholders―) 
und Interessensgruppen („Stakeholders―), sowie einer Gegenüberstellung von Kosten 
und Nutzen. Des Weiteren wird eine umfangreiche Sammlung von themenbezogenen 
Studien betreffend CSR und Finanzleistung vorgestellt. Es folgt die empirische Studie 
mit einer Stichprobe von deutschen Unternehmen, welche einen möglichen negativen 
oder positiven Einfluss von besseren CSR-Ratings auf „Equity-Beta― bzw. Liquidität 
untersucht.Insgesamt sind vier lineare Regressionsanalysen und eine Varianzanalyse 
durchgeführt worden. 
Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen eine statistisch signifikante und negative Korrelation 
zwischen CSR-Ratings und Equity-Beta, selbst wenn Firmengröße, Liquidität, 
Verschuldungsgrad sowie Industrieeffekte als Kontrollvariablen berücksichtigt werden. 
Da der Regressionskoeffizient allerdings nicht signifikant ist, wenn die Kontrollvariablen 
einbezogen werden, scheinen CSR-Ratings keine beeinflussende Wirkung auf Equity-
Beta zu haben. Dasselbe Ergebnis zeigt sich für die gruppierten CSR-Ratings. 
Zusätzlich wird ein möglicher Zusammenhang zwischen CSR-Ratings und Liquidität 
untersucht. Ähnlich der Ergebnisse zu Equity-Beta, suggerieren die Resultate auch 
hier, dass CSR-Ratings keine Einflussgröße für die Liquidität von Aktien darstellen.  
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